
'26-6-09
【明報專訊】渣打集團(2888)在最新業務狀匯報中表示,今年首5個月業績表現強勁,收入及盈利都破紀錄,商業銀行業務表現尤其出色,然而個人銀行業務表現略差,公司努力壓縮成本,員工人數繼續按月下跌。
渣打行政總裁冼博德表示,集團經營所在的市場,經濟環境呈現初步好轉的舻象,但亦看到市場持續受壓的現象。現在就去預測經濟會持續復蘇為時尚早,集團對前景仍持審慎態度,會繼續維持謹慎作風。
集團整體上的淨息差,因債務的邊際利潤受壓輕微下降,但商業銀行的資產邊際利潤較高,有助抵銷部分息差受壓的影響。集團同時嚴格控制開支,自去年第3季以來,員工數目逐月下降,與去年上半年比較,投資開支亦嚴加規範。
渣 打指資產質素大致符合預期。基於外在環境,部分客戶面對更大壓力,導致今年第2季出現較高減值。但年初至今私募股票或策略投資並無出現重大減值。資產抵押 證券組合的帳面值,由去年底的38億美元(約296億港元),下降至今年5月底的約32億美元(約250億港元),主要是因贖回所致。集團流動資金十分充 裕,資產對存款比率維持與去年底相若水平,未來數年需要在資本市場進行再融資的金額非常低,在銀行同業市場依然是主要的淨貸款人。
個人業務持續受壓
個 人銀行業務方面,收入持續受壓,反映債務邊際利潤縮減,及財富管理產品銷情欠佳。儘管今年第2季收入將勝於第1季,預期上半年收入仍較去年下半年為低。但 按揭業務表現出色,尤其在本港,按揭業務規模及收益率均有所上升。商業銀行業務表現非常強勁,於第1季創下紀錄佳績後,4月份表現良好,而5月份則更顯強 勢。
Two companies may have seemingly identical dividend yields, but if one has a history of hiking its payout significantly and frequently, and the other doesn't, the former suddenly becomes far more attractive. These companies recently had similar yields, but very different histories:
| Company | Dividend yield | 5-yr. avg. div. growth rate |
|---|---|---|
| MetLife (NYSE: MET) | 2.6% | 20% |
| Sherwin-Williams | 2.4% | 18% |
| Raytheon (NYSE: RTN) | 2.6% | 7% |
| Wyeth (NYSE: WYE) | 2.8% | 5% |
Data from DividendInvestor.com.
To see why this matters, just imagine buying $10,000 of stock with a 3.5% dividend yield. In the first year, you'll get $350. If that dividend grows by 4% per year for 20 years, it will ultimately amount to a $767 annual payout. But if it grows by 12%, it will become a $3,375 annual payout -- almost five times more, and more than 30% of your original investment.
What to do right now
The riskiest dividend is one that you can't count on. So, pick your dividend payers carefully -- but do pick some, because our downtrodden market currently offers some exceptionally strong yields.
The following candidates that surfaced when I screened for large caps with yields of 2.5% or more, five-year dividend growth rates of 10% or more, and five-year revenue growth rates of 10% or more:
| Company | Dividend yield | 5-yr div. growth | 5-yr. rev. growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Novartis (NYSE: NVS) | 4.6% | 15% | 11% |
| CNOOC (NYSE: CEO) | 4.2% | 23% | 25% |
| MarathonOil | 3.1% | 16% | 14% |
| General Dynamics | 2.8% | 16% | 12% |
History’s greatest investor, Warren Buffett, has two simple rules.
1. The quarter-life crisis
These are a real heartbreaker. You find a dominant company whose once sky-high growth has stalled, and its shares along with it. “TechWidget Corp. is trading at only 15 times earnings right now, only half its five-year average!” you say. “Its earnings have doubled over the past five years, but the shares are down over the same time period. Sounds like a steal!”
Snap! You just walked into a value trap.
Investors falsely believe that names like Dell or eBay (Nasdaq: EBAY) will see their relative valuations return to their headier days. They won’t.
Why? Captain Obvious would say that growth has slowed, technology evolved, and competition emerged. But all that misses the real reason. Instead of returning incremental profits to shareholders via dividends, such companies wreck shareholder value by chasing growth through overexpansion and high-profile acquisitions. Oh, and the ill-timed share repurchases that exist primarily to juice per-share earnings and help sop up all that stock option-driven dilution.
Steer clear of flailing tech titans until they’re willing to follow the lead of Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT) and Oracle (Nasdaq: ORCL) into dividend-paying adulthood.
2. The soaring cyclical
Here’s the rub about cyclical stocks: Their valuations are counterintuitive. They always look the cheapest when they’ve reached their priciest, and look priciest when they’re reached their cheapest.
Take nearly any oilfield service stock from last summer as an example. Transocean (NYSE: RIG) looked dirt cheap via a crude, PEG-style valuation. But savvy investors know that cyclical companies’ profits mean-revert, which is why cyclical stocks’ P/E multiples stay low during booms and high during busts.
In other words, you should be looking at cyclical stocks as their P/Es expand, not shrink.
3. The small-cap Methuselah
The six-year small-cap bull run that came crashing to a halt last year was a painful reminder of a little-known value trap: the Small-Cap Methuselah.
Century-old small-caps you’d never heard of were wrapping up five-year runs of 20% annualized earnings growth. Analysts went gaga, extrapolating those growth rates forward like the party would never end. Valuations followed suit. Gaga analyst, meet mean-reversion.
You won’t find long-run compounding machines within the small-cap space. Show me a company with a long, proven history of creating serious shareholder value, and I’ll show you a mid- or large-cap stock.
4. The too-high yielder
A company usually has a high yield (think above 7%) for one of three reasons:
5. The unopened book
I can already see the Ben Graham fanatics gearing up to peg me with tomatoes, but hear me out. Book values need to be adjusted -- especially heading into and during recessions.
Acquisition-happy companies inevitably end up slashing the goodwill they’d booked while making bloated acquisitions in the years previous. The book values of asset-centric plays (homebuilders, natural resource producers, etc.) also need a good tweaking to reflect the depressed values of those assets. And financials, well, what can I say? Just ask any Citigroup (NYSE: C) or AIG (NYSE: AIG) investor about the ease of assessing their balance sheets.
Don’t get me wrong: I’m all for buying stocks on the cheap. We do just that at Income Investor. But there’s a catch: We’re only interested in good values if they also happen to be great businesses, companies with years of exceptional performance behind and ahead of them. And, of course, ones that pay us to wait for our thesis to play out.
Wrapping the traps
To recap, you can smooth and improve your returns if you:
You’ve probably picked up on an underlying theme here: You need unconventionally conventional thinking if you want low-stress success in the stock market.
You know those old investing platitudes? Be greedy when others are fearful. Buy when there's blood in the streets. You make most of your money in a bear market -- you just don't know it at the time.
They're all true. And they've never been more applicable than right now.
Our economy is likely headed for some rough times, but there's little doubt that America will survive -- and ultimately thrive. In the words of Warren Buffett: "This country is going to be living better 10 years from now than it is now. It will be living better in 20 years from now than 10 years from now. ... We've got all the ingredients for a sensational future."
Buffett's been busy lately putting his money where his mouth is. He has made high-profile investments in General Electric and Goldman Sachs' preferred stock, and he's likely licking his chops right now at the prospect of deploying capital in this target-rich environment.
So if Buffett's buying, why aren't fund managers following suit?
Volatile present, sensational future
Many fund managers likely agree with Buffett's sentiments. And at today's prices, they wish they could be like Buffett and buy stocks. However, due to a panicked investing populace, that's simply not possible.
You see, when individual investors elect to withdraw their money from a mutual fund, the fund manager must quickly come up with the cash to redeem those investors. For the week ended Oct. 8, equity investors withdrew a whopping $43 billion from mutual funds, spurring a wave of selling by fund managers -- even though those managers likely still believed in the prospects of the stocks they were selling!
As Morningstar's Director of Equity Research Pat Dorsey explained in a recent video, these stock sales had "nothing to do with fundamentals, nothing to do with the underpinnings of our economy ... no matter what the stocks are, no matter how attractive those assets may be, [fund managers] have to sell them because they need to raise the cash to send those checks out" to their investors.
And that $43 billion figure doesn't even include hedge fund managers who are forced to sell stocks due to investor redemptions and margin calls!
As master money manager Ken Heebner -- skipper of the CGM Focus fund -- told USA Today, "The reason for the sharp decline is massive selling from hedge funds, not because they want to, but because they have to reduce their leverage ... it's the biggest margin call since 1929."In his commentary to Ben Graham's The Intelligent Investor, Jason Zweig wrote:
Anything over 60% [institutional ownership] suggests that a stock is scarcely undiscovered and probably "overowned." When big institutions sell, they tend to move in lockstep, with disastrous results for the stock. Imagine all the Radio City Rockettes toppling off the front edge of the stage at once and you get the idea.
To see what he's talking about, take a look at the following table of great "overowned" companies:
| Company | Institutional Ownership % (as of Last Quarter) | Stock Performance Over the Past Month |
|---|---|---|
| Apple (Nasdaq: AAPL) | 68% | (41.5%) |
| Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ) | 65.6% | (19.3%) |
| McDonald's (NYSE: MCD) | 79.8% | (17.6%) |
| Merck (NYSE: MRK) | 80.4% | (23.7%) |
| Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT) | 66.4% | (14.6%) |
| PepsiCo (NYSE: PEP) | 74.3% | (16.2%) |
| Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG) | 60.6% | (15.3%) |
Period | Market Decline | DJIA Change 1 Year After Decline | DJIA Change 2 Years After Decline (cumulative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dec. 1961 -- June 1962 | (27.1%) | 32.3% | 55.1% |
| Feb. 1966 -- May 1970 | (36.6%) | 43.6% | 53.9% |
| Jan. 1973 -- Dec. 1974 | (45.1%) | 42.2% | 66.5% |
| Sep. 1976 -- Feb. 1978 | (26.9%) | 9% | 15.1% |
| Aug. 1987 -- Oct. 1987 | (36.1%) | 22.9% | 54.3% |
| July 1990 -- Oct. 1990 | (21.2%) | 26.2% | 32.6% |
| Jan. 2000 -- March 2003 | (35.8%) | 34.6% | 43.2% |
| Average | (32.7%) | 29.4% | 45.8% |
| Oct. 2007 -- Dec. 2008 | (46.7%) | ? | ? |
Company | Decline, Jan. 2000 – March 2003 | Change 2 Years After Decline |
|---|---|---|
| Apple (Nasdaq: AAPL) | (74.7%) | 488.6% |
| Best Buy (NYSE: BBY) | (29.6%) | 97.5% |
| Boeing (NYSE: BA) | (38.2%) | 127.7% |
| Copart (Nasdaq: CPRT) | (40.9%) | 209.6% |
| Genentech (NYSE: DNA) | (48.5%) | 223.3% |
| McDonald's (NYSE: MCD) | (63.5%) | 121.6% |
| T. Rowe Price (Nasdaq: TROW) | (22.8%) | 114.8% |