大部份企業的市值比2010年尾低了一截﹐很容易造成股市已經便宜的錯覺。我認為Graham是對的﹐基本上﹐PExPB少過22﹐才算是便宜區。但是22~1的高度仍然是一個可以跌死人﹐甚至5~1的高度也可以搞殘大部份人。我想﹐了解PExPB少過22的朋友﹐應該體會到。雖然我分析過2007-09年市場先生的rock n roll﹐對于企業的市價﹐以及最糟糕的情形﹐知道了一點點。但是﹐老實說﹐我就像是個小學生﹐知道的不代表真知道﹐體會了才算是真知道。
今年而已﹐我的本金損失大約是6%﹐我個人認為仍然安全﹐回報仍然合理。
八月里﹐我在做的事就是儘量小換大﹐即係enterprising換defensive﹐
條件是
1) 夠便宜﹐又有派息
即係PExPB少過10
2) 我能看到的商業活動
持股的種類反而減少﹐不過﹐我認為﹐
i do the best
Monday, August 29, 2011
Friday, August 19, 2011
沽空is unattractive
Data Relating to Standard & Poor's Composite Index in Various Years
a Yield on S&P AAA bonds
b Calender years in 1948-1968, plus year ended June 1971
c Earning yield means the earnings divided by the price, in%
d Price in Oct. 1971, equivalent to 900 for the DJIA
e Three-year average figures
**************
以上的列表是來自The Intelligent Investor-A Century of Stock-Market History, page 38.
雖然數據介於1948~1971年之間﹐我個人卻認為對今天的股市仍然有深層的意義。
當時﹐1971年﹐DJIA大約是900點﹐Graham在The Intelligent Investor fourth revised edition 曾經對1971年的股市﹐給予這樣的批評﹕
The 3-year price/earnings ratio for the market was lower in October 1971 than at year-end 1963 and 1968. It was about the same as in 1958, but much higher than in the early years of the long bull market. This important indicator, taken by it itself, could not be construed to indicate that the market was especially high in January 1972.
But when the interest yield on high-grade bonds is brought into the picture, the implications become much less favorable.
The reader will note from our table that the ratio of stock returns (earnings/price) to bond returns has grown worse during the entire period, so that the January 1972 figure was less favorable to stocks, by this criterion, than in any of the previous years examined.
When dividend yields are compared with bond yields we find that the relationship was completely reversed between 1948 and 1972. In the early year stocks yielded twice as much as bonds; now bonds yield twice as much, and more, than stocks.
Our final judgment is that the adverse change in the bond-yield/stock-yield ratio fully offset the better price/earnings ratio for late 1971, based on the 3-year earning figures. Hence our view of the early 1972 market level would tend to be the same as it was some 7 years ago,
that it is unattractive one from the standpoint of conservative investment.
**************************
回到2011年動蕩不安的8月﹐今天我在某個熱門blog看到﹐該blog主說應該把圖表倒轉來看﹐沽空是順流﹐能睡好覺。
如果檢查現在的美國債券利息﹐我們知道2-30年的利息大約是0.19~3.40%﹐10年債息大約是2.09%。
我個人的看法﹐現在的情況﹐應該是Graham所說的反面﹐即係﹕
當我想到El-Erian說這是 new-era﹐
當我看到買熊證的人逐漸增加
我認為沽空is unattractive
|
| Year(b) | 1948 | 1953 | 1958 | 1963 | 1968 | 1971(d) |
| 1
| Closing price | 15.2 | 24.81 | 55.21 | 75.02 | 103.9 | 100 |
| 2
| Earned in current year | 2.24 | 2.51 | 2.89 | 4.02 | 5.76 | 5.23 |
| 3
| Average earnings of last 3 years | 1.65 | 2.44 | 2.22 | 3.63 | 5.37 | 5.53 |
| 4
| Dividend in current year | 0.93 | 1.48 | 1.75 | 2.28 | 2.99 | 3.1 |
| 5
| High-grade bond interest(a) | 2.77% | 3.08% | 4.12% | 4.36% | 6.51% | 7.58% |
| 6
| Wholesale-price index | 87.9 | 92.7 | 100.4 | 105 | 108.7 | 114.3 |
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| Ratios: |
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| 7
| Price/last year's earnings | 6.3x | 9.9x | 18.4x | 18.6x | 18.0x | 19.2x |
| 8
| Price/3-year's earnings | 9.2x | 10.2x | 17.6x | 20.7x | 19.5x | 18.x |
| 9
| 3-years' earning yield(c) | 10.9% | 9.8% | 5.8% | 4.8% | 5.15% | 5.53% |
| 10
| Dividend yield | 5.6% | 5.5% | 3.3% | 3.04% | 2.87% | 3.11% |
| 11
| Stock-earning yield/bond yield | 3.96x | 3.20x | 1.41x | 1.10x | 0.80x | 0.72x |
| 12
| Dividend yield/bond yield | 2.1x | 1.8x | 0.80x | 0.70x | 0.44x | 0.41x |
| 13
| Earning/book value(e) | 11.2% | 11.8% | 12.8% | 10.5% | 11.5% | 11.5% |
a Yield on S&P AAA bonds
b Calender years in 1948-1968, plus year ended June 1971
c Earning yield means the earnings divided by the price, in%
d Price in Oct. 1971, equivalent to 900 for the DJIA
e Three-year average figures
**************
以上的列表是來自The Intelligent Investor-A Century of Stock-Market History, page 38.
雖然數據介於1948~1971年之間﹐我個人卻認為對今天的股市仍然有深層的意義。
當時﹐1971年﹐DJIA大約是900點﹐Graham在The Intelligent Investor fourth revised edition 曾經對1971年的股市﹐給予這樣的批評﹕
The 3-year price/earnings ratio for the market was lower in October 1971 than at year-end 1963 and 1968. It was about the same as in 1958, but much higher than in the early years of the long bull market. This important indicator, taken by it itself, could not be construed to indicate that the market was especially high in January 1972.
But when the interest yield on high-grade bonds is brought into the picture, the implications become much less favorable.
The reader will note from our table that the ratio of stock returns (earnings/price) to bond returns has grown worse during the entire period, so that the January 1972 figure was less favorable to stocks, by this criterion, than in any of the previous years examined.
When dividend yields are compared with bond yields we find that the relationship was completely reversed between 1948 and 1972. In the early year stocks yielded twice as much as bonds; now bonds yield twice as much, and more, than stocks.
Our final judgment is that the adverse change in the bond-yield/stock-yield ratio fully offset the better price/earnings ratio for late 1971, based on the 3-year earning figures. Hence our view of the early 1972 market level would tend to be the same as it was some 7 years ago,
that it is unattractive one from the standpoint of conservative investment.
- Stock-earning yield/bond yield‹1
- Dividend yield/bond yield‹1
**************************
回到2011年動蕩不安的8月﹐今天我在某個熱門blog看到﹐該blog主說應該把圖表倒轉來看﹐沽空是順流﹐能睡好覺。
如果檢查現在的美國債券利息﹐我們知道2-30年的利息大約是0.19~3.40%﹐10年債息大約是2.09%。
我個人的看法﹐現在的情況﹐應該是Graham所說的反面﹐即係﹕
- Stock-earning yield/bond yield›1
- Dividend yield/bond yield›1
當我想到El-Erian說這是 new-era﹐
當我看到買熊證的人逐漸增加
我認為沽空is unattractive
Wednesday, August 17, 2011
小小的建議
rather than of search and acceptance
我個人建議先從恆生指數成份股--exclusion and rejection
例如﹕
0005---P/B = 1.03
3988---P/B = 1.14
3328---P/B = 1.23
0998---P/B = 1.15
大型市值的同行比較﹕
0939---P/B = 1.65
1398---P/B = 1.84
1288---P/B = 1.69
市值類似的同行比較﹕
2888---P/B = 1.40
3618---P/B = 1.30
1988---P/B = 1.30
3968---P/B = 2.20
2388---P/B = 1.90
0011---P/B = 2.90
個人認為指數成份股﹐在等待的過程﹐精神的折磨可能會比較輕。
(0998非指數成份股)
我個人建議先從恆生指數成份股--exclusion and rejection
例如﹕
0005---P/B = 1.03
3988---P/B = 1.14
3328---P/B = 1.23
0998---P/B = 1.15
大型市值的同行比較﹕
0939---P/B = 1.65
1398---P/B = 1.84
1288---P/B = 1.69
市值類似的同行比較﹕
2888---P/B = 1.40
3618---P/B = 1.30
1988---P/B = 1.30
3968---P/B = 2.20
2388---P/B = 1.90
0011---P/B = 2.90
個人認為指數成份股﹐在等待的過程﹐精神的折磨可能會比較輕。
(0998非指數成份股)
Monday, August 15, 2011
One of our chief requirement
The Intelligent Investor, page xvi - Introduction
Graham :
Strangely enough, we shall suggest as one of our chief requirements here that our readers limit themselves to issues selling not far above their tangible-asset value.
The reason for this seemingly outmoded counsel is both practical and psychological. Experience has taught us that, while there are many good growth companies worth several time net assets, the buyer of such shares will be too dependent on vagaries and fluctuations of the stock market.
By contrast, the investor in shares, say, of public utility companies at about their net-asset value can always consider himself the owner of an interest in sound and expanding businesses, acquired at a rational price - regardless of what the stock market might say to the contrary. The ultimate result of such a conservative policy is likely to work out better than exciting adventures into the glamorous and dangerous fields of anticipated growth.
如果付出的價格不昂貴﹐而且企業的生意逐漸增加﹐身為這家企業的股東﹐已經是掌握了有益心態﹐比一般人更能夠承受股市的價格波動。
Graham :
Strangely enough, we shall suggest as one of our chief requirements here that our readers limit themselves to issues selling not far above their tangible-asset value.
The reason for this seemingly outmoded counsel is both practical and psychological. Experience has taught us that, while there are many good growth companies worth several time net assets, the buyer of such shares will be too dependent on vagaries and fluctuations of the stock market.
By contrast, the investor in shares, say, of public utility companies at about their net-asset value can always consider himself the owner of an interest in sound and expanding businesses, acquired at a rational price - regardless of what the stock market might say to the contrary. The ultimate result of such a conservative policy is likely to work out better than exciting adventures into the glamorous and dangerous fields of anticipated growth.
如果付出的價格不昂貴﹐而且企業的生意逐漸增加﹐身為這家企業的股東﹐已經是掌握了有益心態﹐比一般人更能夠承受股市的價格波動。
Investor's chief problem
The Intelligent Investor, page xv - Introduction
Graham :
For indeed, the investor's chief problem - and even his worst enemy - is likely to be himself. ("The fault, dear investor, is not in our stars - and not in our stocks - but in ourselves.....")
This has proved the more true over recent decades as it has become more necessary for conservative investors to acquire common stocks and thus to expose themselves, willy-nilly , to the excitement and temptations of the stock market. By arguments, examples, and exhortation, we hope to aid our readers to establish the proper mental and emotional attitudes toward their investment decisions. We have seen much more money made and kept by "ordinary people" who were temperamentally well suited for the investment process than by those who lacked this quality, even though they had an extensive knowledge of finance, accounting, and stock market lore.
Additionally, we hope to implant in the reader a tendency to measure or quantity. For 99 issues out of 100 we could say that at some price they are cheap enough to buy and at some other price they would be so dear that they should be sold. The habit of relating what is paid to what is being offered is an invaluable trait in investment. In an article in a women's magazine many years ago we advised the readers to buy their stocks as they bought theirs groceries, not as they bought their perfume. The really dreadful losses of the past few years (and on many similar occasions before) were realized in those common stock issues where the buyer forgot to ask "how much?"
*********************************
一只牛﹕
the investor's chief problem - and even his worst enemy - is likely to be himself.
投資人最大的問題﹐最大的敵人﹐其實就是自己﹐不是星星月亮﹐也不是‘他媽的’股票。
We have seen much more money made and kept by "ordinary people" who were temperamentally well suited for the investment process than by those who lacked this quality, even though they had an extensive knowledge of finance, accounting, and stock market lore.
大部份賺錢和存到錢﹐都是“普通人”。
For 99 issues out of 100 we could say that at some price they are cheap enough to buy and at some other price they would be so dear that they should be sold.
100只股票﹐99只股票是在這個價格便宜﹐在那個價格昂貴。
The habit of relating what is paid to what is being offered is an invaluable trait in investment.
了解價格-價值的關係﹐這是絕招。
we advised the readers to buy their stocks as they bought theirs groceries, not as they bought their perfume.
買股票要好像窮佬買雜貨﹐不應該像闊太買香水。
Graham :
For indeed, the investor's chief problem - and even his worst enemy - is likely to be himself. ("The fault, dear investor, is not in our stars - and not in our stocks - but in ourselves.....")
This has proved the more true over recent decades as it has become more necessary for conservative investors to acquire common stocks and thus to expose themselves, willy-nilly , to the excitement and temptations of the stock market. By arguments, examples, and exhortation, we hope to aid our readers to establish the proper mental and emotional attitudes toward their investment decisions. We have seen much more money made and kept by "ordinary people" who were temperamentally well suited for the investment process than by those who lacked this quality, even though they had an extensive knowledge of finance, accounting, and stock market lore.
Additionally, we hope to implant in the reader a tendency to measure or quantity. For 99 issues out of 100 we could say that at some price they are cheap enough to buy and at some other price they would be so dear that they should be sold. The habit of relating what is paid to what is being offered is an invaluable trait in investment. In an article in a women's magazine many years ago we advised the readers to buy their stocks as they bought theirs groceries, not as they bought their perfume. The really dreadful losses of the past few years (and on many similar occasions before) were realized in those common stock issues where the buyer forgot to ask "how much?"
*********************************
一只牛﹕
the investor's chief problem - and even his worst enemy - is likely to be himself.
投資人最大的問題﹐最大的敵人﹐其實就是自己﹐不是星星月亮﹐也不是‘他媽的’股票。
We have seen much more money made and kept by "ordinary people" who were temperamentally well suited for the investment process than by those who lacked this quality, even though they had an extensive knowledge of finance, accounting, and stock market lore.
大部份賺錢和存到錢﹐都是“普通人”。
For 99 issues out of 100 we could say that at some price they are cheap enough to buy and at some other price they would be so dear that they should be sold.
100只股票﹐99只股票是在這個價格便宜﹐在那個價格昂貴。
The habit of relating what is paid to what is being offered is an invaluable trait in investment.
了解價格-價值的關係﹐這是絕招。
we advised the readers to buy their stocks as they bought theirs groceries, not as they bought their perfume.
買股票要好像窮佬買雜貨﹐不應該像闊太買香水。
Saturday, August 13, 2011
When it’s raining gold
巴菲特說﹕
Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
我資格淺﹐無法肯定這次是不是大機會﹖
但﹐這不重要﹐因為我發覺到﹐
無論是defensive的觀察名單﹐或已經買入的﹐它們的估價﹐已經很接近enterprising組合
我的意思是﹐比喻﹕
大嶼山的地皮每尺19
太平山頂某些地方每尺9--44
雖然這一次﹐大嶼山的地皮可能或已經變成19之下﹐但是把它轉換去太平山頂﹐應該是當務之急。
太平山頂A號是每尺44﹐雖然不是‘他媽的’價﹐但是便宜區在26-63﹐如果不從大嶼山轉換過來﹐我無法睡覺。況且和大多數富豪作鄰居﹐託富豪的洪福﹐就能間接造成有益的心態。既然每尺44我都行動﹐更何況太平山頂B號是每尺24。還有更特別的﹐不知道是什麼尺價﹐只知道也是在太平山頂﹐牌號好像是2800。
當然﹐大嶼山也有過人之處﹐例如尺價1-3元﹐甚至是免費的﹐我就保留這些。
所以前陣子停筆﹐因為忙著“轉換”。
Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
我資格淺﹐無法肯定這次是不是大機會﹖
但﹐這不重要﹐因為我發覺到﹐
無論是defensive的觀察名單﹐或已經買入的﹐它們的估價﹐已經很接近enterprising組合
我的意思是﹐比喻﹕
大嶼山的地皮每尺19
太平山頂某些地方每尺9--44
雖然這一次﹐大嶼山的地皮可能或已經變成19之下﹐但是把它轉換去太平山頂﹐應該是當務之急。
太平山頂A號是每尺44﹐雖然不是‘他媽的’價﹐但是便宜區在26-63﹐如果不從大嶼山轉換過來﹐我無法睡覺。況且和大多數富豪作鄰居﹐託富豪的洪福﹐就能間接造成有益的心態。既然每尺44我都行動﹐更何況太平山頂B號是每尺24。還有更特別的﹐不知道是什麼尺價﹐只知道也是在太平山頂﹐牌號好像是2800。
當然﹐大嶼山也有過人之處﹐例如尺價1-3元﹐甚至是免費的﹐我就保留這些。
所以前陣子停筆﹐因為忙著“轉換”。
很邏輯﹐我相信﹐我照著做
Sir John Marks Templeton好像這樣說過﹐成功的條件之首﹐就是要有宗教信用。
很多年前﹐我就知道了。
我知道﹐不代表我知道。
不過﹐坦白的說﹐每天早晚上香﹐我會祈禱﹕
眾天神﹑五方五土龍神﹑唐番地主財神﹑觀音菩薩﹐保祐我的投資順利
年紀越大﹐越覺得自己渺小。
每一次閱讀SA或Intelligent Investor﹐越覺得自己渺小。
經歷股災﹐越覺得自己渺小。
我個人認為﹐股海無涯﹐唯勤是岸。
自問﹐何謂勤﹖
我個人認為﹐掌握投資﹐反復的練習﹐反復的檢驗﹐就是勤。
自問﹐何謂投資﹖
An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and a satisfactory return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.
坦白的說﹐我已經不年青了﹐雖然是一只牛﹐但是不合乎邏輯的東西﹐我會不相信。
父母說﹕勤勞做就餓不死
很邏輯﹐我相信﹐我照著做﹐所以我沒有捱餓。
(哈哈﹗不計較﹐一家人有飯吃﹐我也算是富有)
Graham說﹕
We are concerned chiefly with concepts(概念﹐觀念﹐思想), methods(方法), standards(標準), principle(原則), above all, with logical(邏輯) reasoning. We have stressed theory not for itself alone but for its value in practice. We have tried to avoid prescribing standards which are too stringent to follow, or technique methods which are trouble than they are worth.
很邏輯﹐我相信﹐我照著做﹐所以我沒有..........
Rocky﹕
鼻子被打歪了﹐或者有人認為活該/悲慘﹐為何要面對Apolo的拳頭。
但是﹐我認為沒什麼大不了﹐
不面對Apolo的拳頭﹐i am nobody﹐我會一生遺憾。
捱過Apolo的拳頭﹐i am nobody﹐曾經嘗試過。
鼻子被打歪了﹐不過是look better。
很多年前﹐我就知道了。
我知道﹐不代表我知道。
不過﹐坦白的說﹐每天早晚上香﹐我會祈禱﹕
眾天神﹑五方五土龍神﹑唐番地主財神﹑觀音菩薩﹐保祐我的投資順利
年紀越大﹐越覺得自己渺小。
每一次閱讀SA或Intelligent Investor﹐越覺得自己渺小。
經歷股災﹐越覺得自己渺小。
我個人認為﹐股海無涯﹐唯勤是岸。
自問﹐何謂勤﹖
我個人認為﹐掌握投資﹐反復的練習﹐反復的檢驗﹐就是勤。
自問﹐何謂投資﹖
An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and a satisfactory return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative.
坦白的說﹐我已經不年青了﹐雖然是一只牛﹐但是不合乎邏輯的東西﹐我會不相信。
父母說﹕勤勞做就餓不死
很邏輯﹐我相信﹐我照著做﹐所以我沒有捱餓。
(哈哈﹗不計較﹐一家人有飯吃﹐我也算是富有)
Graham說﹕
We are concerned chiefly with concepts(概念﹐觀念﹐思想), methods(方法), standards(標準), principle(原則), above all, with logical(邏輯) reasoning. We have stressed theory not for itself alone but for its value in practice. We have tried to avoid prescribing standards which are too stringent to follow, or technique methods which are trouble than they are worth.
很邏輯﹐我相信﹐我照著做﹐所以我沒有..........
Rocky﹕
鼻子被打歪了﹐或者有人認為活該/悲慘﹐為何要面對Apolo的拳頭。
但是﹐我認為沒什麼大不了﹐
不面對Apolo的拳頭﹐i am nobody﹐我會一生遺憾。
捱過Apolo的拳頭﹐i am nobody﹐曾經嘗試過。
鼻子被打歪了﹐不過是look better。
Friday, August 12, 2011
我祝福各位朋友
前一篇功課(The Concept of Intrinsic Value)的日期是21-7-11﹐我說是功課﹐不是文章﹐因為那是SA(Security Analysis)的內容﹐不是我的創作。
當然﹐我還在繼續閱讀SA﹐但速度很慢﹐因為受到干擾。
干擾是因為市場先生在吶喊股災啊﹗
我第一次經歷的股災是2008-09年﹐那時候我是一只牛﹐對我來說﹐真的是災難臨頭﹐10年的儲蓄大幅縮水。我對自己說﹐我是一只牛。每個晚上﹐我重復看ROCKY﹐Rocky 說﹕
i am nobody
我對所知道的方法/方式﹐一遍又一遍對持有的股票重復練習﹐算過了再算。
我沒看過SA﹐我認為我用的是foundamental analysis。
Rocky 說﹕
hit me﹐hit me﹐ i still stand here
而﹐一只牛是被打到爬地。
原來﹐我根本就不懂﹐過去是運氣關照而已。
我不是Rocky﹐過不了15局﹐沒有奇跡。
2010年﹐我開始看SA(謝謝巴黎先生)。
我以為拳頭硬了﹐可以混世界了。
過不了15局﹐沒有奇跡﹐能站起來﹐是運氣關照而已。
2011年﹐再看SA﹐開始看Intelligent investor。
看了再看﹐練習了再練習。
至今﹐我是一只牛
i am no body
i still stand here
我衷心謝謝﹐
在我跌到﹐扶起我﹐教導過我的良朋益友。
這次﹐我是捱過了15局﹐也給了對方左右勾拳。
我知道接下來人生有的是無數的15局﹐唯有把身體練硬﹐把拳頭練硬﹐把腳步練靈活﹐才能捱過去。
我祝福各位朋友﹐通通都能平安捱過去。
當然﹐我還在繼續閱讀SA﹐但速度很慢﹐因為受到干擾。
干擾是因為市場先生在吶喊股災啊﹗
我第一次經歷的股災是2008-09年﹐那時候我是一只牛﹐對我來說﹐真的是災難臨頭﹐10年的儲蓄大幅縮水。我對自己說﹐我是一只牛。每個晚上﹐我重復看ROCKY﹐Rocky 說﹕
i am nobody
我對所知道的方法/方式﹐一遍又一遍對持有的股票重復練習﹐算過了再算。
我沒看過SA﹐我認為我用的是foundamental analysis。
Rocky 說﹕
hit me﹐hit me﹐ i still stand here
而﹐一只牛是被打到爬地。
原來﹐我根本就不懂﹐過去是運氣關照而已。
我不是Rocky﹐過不了15局﹐沒有奇跡。
2010年﹐我開始看SA(謝謝巴黎先生)。
我以為拳頭硬了﹐可以混世界了。
過不了15局﹐沒有奇跡﹐能站起來﹐是運氣關照而已。
2011年﹐再看SA﹐開始看Intelligent investor。
看了再看﹐練習了再練習。
至今﹐我是一只牛
i am no body
i still stand here
我衷心謝謝﹐
在我跌到﹐扶起我﹐教導過我的良朋益友。
這次﹐我是捱過了15局﹐也給了對方左右勾拳。
我知道接下來人生有的是無數的15局﹐唯有把身體練硬﹐把拳頭練硬﹐把腳步練靈活﹐才能捱過去。
我祝福各位朋友﹐通通都能平安捱過去。
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