Thursday, July 21, 2011

The Concept of Intrinsic Value

(SA, Page 16)

Let us take an example from the field of common stock. In 1922, prior(之前) to the boom in aviation securities, Wright Aeronautical Corporation stock was selling on the New York Stock Exchange at only $8, although(雖然) it was paying a $1 dividend, had some time been earning earning over $2 a share, and showed more than $8 per share in cash assets in the treasury(資產). In this case analysis would readily have established(已確立的) that the intrinsic(內在) value of the issue(股票) was substantially(實質上) above the market price.

Again, consider the same issue in 1928 when it had advance to $280 per share. It was then earning at the rate $8 per share, as against $3.77 in 1927. The dividend rate was $2; the net-asset value was less than $50 per share. A study of this picture must have shown conclusively(確定的) that the market price represented(表示) for the most part the capitalization(資本額) of entirely(全部) conjectural(推測) future prospects----in other words, that the intrinsic value was far less than market quotation.

一只牛﹕

A
B

1922 1927 1928
股價 $ 8.00
$ 280
EPS $ 2.00 $ 3.77 $ 8
Dividend $ 1.00
$ 2
B $ 8.00
$ 50




PE 4
35
PB 1
5.6




PExPB 4
196
Yield% 12.5%
0.7%


A﹕intrinsic(內在) value of the issue(股票) was substantially(實質上) above the market price.

B﹕the intrinsic value was far less than market quotation(股價).


從這個例子可以看到﹐Graham沒有說Wright Aeronautical Corporation的價值的數字﹐他沒有說﹐他只是說﹕
  • 價值高過市價
  • 價值少過市價
市價有數字﹐價值沒有﹐價值是感覺﹐只有經過數據的分析﹐才會有的感覺。


Intrinsic value vs. Price
(SA, Page 17)

From the foregoing(前述的) examples(例子) it will be seen(看來) that the work of securities analyst not without concrete results of considerable(值得考慮的) practical value, and that is applicable(看應用的) to a wide variety(各式各樣) of situations(情況). In all of these instances(實例) he appears(顯露) to be concerned(關於) with the intrinsic value of the security and more particularly(獨特的) with the discovery(發現) of discrepancies(差異) between the intrinsic value and the market price. We must recognize(認清楚), however(無論如何), that intrinsic value is an elusive(難以理解的) concept. In general(普通的) term(詞) it is understood(明白) to be that value which is justified(有正當理由的) by the facts(數據), e.g., the assets, earnings, dividends, definite(肯定的) prospects(前景), as distinct(與它不同的), let us say, from market qoatations(市價) established(被制定) by artificial(人造的) manipulation(操縱) or distorted(歪曲) by psychological excesses(過份行為). But it is a great mistake to imagine(想像) that intrinsic value is as definite(肯定的) and as determinable(可決定的) as is the market price. Some time ago intrinsic value (in the case of common stock) was thought(被認為) to be about the same thing as"book value", i.e., it was equal to the net assets of the business, fairly priced. This view(看法) of intrinsic value was quite(相當) definite(肯定的), but it proved(被證明) almost worthless(無用的) as a practical(實際) matter because neither(即不是) the average earning nor(也不是) the average market price evinced(顯示出) any tendency(傾向) to be governed(支配) by the book value.


從前述的例子來看﹐證券分析家除了分析出有效的價值﹐他的方法也必須能應用在各式各樣的情況。他的舉例除了顯露證券的價值﹐最獨特的是發現價值與價格的差異。我們要認清楚﹐無論如何﹐價值是難以理解的概念。簡單的說﹐價值的背後是數據﹐例如﹐資產﹐盈利﹐股息﹐肯定的前景﹐與它不同的﹐市場的價格是人可以操縱或被瘋狂歪曲。但是﹐認為市價等于價值﹐就大錯特錯了。以前﹐有人認為價值就是帳面值﹐即係企業的淨資產。這看法雖然沒錯﹐但是在事實上已經被證明行不通﹐因為不管是平均盈利﹐還是平均市價﹐沒有任何傾向是受到帳面值影響。


Intrinsic Value and "Earning Power"
(SA, Page 17)

Hence this idea was superseded by a newer view, viz, that the intrinsic value of a business was determined(被確定是) by its earning power. But the phrase(說法) "earning power" must imply(意味著) a fairly(公平) confident(信心) expectation(期待) of certain future results. It is not sufficient(充足) to know what the past earnings have averaged, or even that they disclose(透露) a definite line of growth or decline. They must be plausible(似真似假) grounds for believing that this average or this trend is a dependable(可靠) guide to the future. Experience has shown only too forcibly(有說服力) that in many instances this far from true. This mean that the concept of "earning power", expressed as a definite figure, and the derived(得到) concept of intrinsic value, as something equally definite and ascertainable, cannot be safely accepted as a general premise(假設) of security analysis.

之前已經說明價值不是帳面值﹐後來又有人說價值就是盈利能力。“盈利能力”一詞表示對未來業績的預測﹐而這預測有充份的數據支持。以前的平均盈利是不足以推算未來的盈利﹐也不能正確透露未來盈利的升跌。盈利的趨勢似真似假﹐對未來的推測是不可靠的。很多可靠的經驗和例子已經證明平均盈利和盈利的趨勢是不管用。以“盈利能力”的概念﹐計算出有數據支持的數字﹐來得到價值的概念﹐是一種可以也不可以﹐這種假設不能被證券分析接受。

Example :
To make this reasoning clearer, let us consider a concrete and typical(有代表性) example. What would we mean by the intrinsic value of J.I.Case Company common, as analyzed, say, early in 1933? The market price as $30; the asset value per share was $176; no dividend was being paid; the average earnings for ten years had been $9.50 per share; the results for 1932 had shown a deficit(虧損) of $17 per share. If we followed a customary(按慣例) method of appraisal(評估), we might take the average earnings per share of common for ten years, multiply this average by ten, and arrive at an intrinsic value of $95. But let us examine(檢查) the individual figures which make up this ten year average. They are as follow:

1932 $(17.40)
1931 $(2.90)
1930 $ 11.00
1929 $ 20.40
1928 $ 26.90
1927 $ 26.00
1926 $ 23.30
1925 $ 15.30
1924 $ (5.90)
1923 $ (2.10)


平均 $ 9.50

補充﹕
-1933年的市價=$30
-帳面值=$176
-沒有股息


This average of $9.50 is obviously(明顯) nothing more than an arithmetical(算術) resultant from ten unrelated figures. It can hardly be urged(極力主張) that this average is in any way representative of typical conditions in the past or representative of what may be expected in the future. Hence any figure of "real" or intrinsic value derived from this average must be characterized(描繪) as equally accidental or artificial.



以上是J.I.Case Company的10年盈利紀錄﹐那麼它1933年的價值是多少﹖
按照一般的算法﹐以10年平均盈利﹐乘以10倍﹐算到的價值是$95。

$9.50只是從10個無關聯數字計算出來的平均數字。很難說這數字代表了過去或預測未來。因此﹐任何從這個平均數字聯想到的價值﹐只是意外或者捏造出來的。


The Role of Intrinsic Value in the Work of Analyst
(SA, Page 18)

Let us try to formulate(用公式表示) a statement(報告) of the role(角色) of intrinsic value in the work of analyst which will reconcile(調解) the rather(而不是) conflicting(衝突) implications(涉及) of our various examples. The essential(要點) point is that securities analysis does not seek(尋找) to determine exactly what is the intrinsic value of a given security. It needs only to establish either that the value is adequate(足夠的), e.g., to protect a bond or to justify(證明) a stock purchase, or else that the value is considerably higher or considerably lower than the market price. For such purposes an indefinite(模糊的) and approximate(接近的) measure of the intrinsic value may be sufficient(足夠). To use a homely simile, it is quite possible to decide by inspection that a women enough to vote without knowing her age, or that a man is heavier than he should be without knowing his exact weight.

重點並非得到證券正確的價值。而是要證實的價值是否“足夠”﹐例如﹕
1) 債券有足夠的保障﹐股票有足夠買入的理由
2) 價值高于市價或低過市價(價值/價格的距離)

對于以上的目的﹐模糊或接近的價值數字已經是足夠的了。
估計女人的歲數並不需要知道她的正確年齡﹐是否是胖子也不需要知道他的正確重量。


Example No.1:
In 1928 the public was offered a large issue of 6% noncumulative preferred stock of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company priced at $100. The record showed that in no year in the company's history earnings been equivalent to as much as 1.5 times the fixed charges and preffered dividends combined.

Graham comment:
The rejection of St. Louis-San Francisco Preferred did not require an exact calculation of the intrinsic value of this railroad system. It was enough to show, very simply from earning record, that the margin of value above the bondholders' and preferred stockholders' claims was too small to assure safety.

我們不需要正確知道St. Louis-San Francisco的鐵路系統的商業價值﹐就已經可以拒絕買入它的優先股。因為從它的盈利紀錄就已經充足的知道﹐不管是對債權人還是優先股股東的權益保障﹐顯然是太小了。

Example No.2:
In June 1932 it was possible to purchase 5% bonds of Owens-Illinois Glass Company, due 1939,
a) at 70, yielding 11% to maturity.
b) The company earnings were many times the interest requirements--not only on the average but even at that time of severe depression.
c) The bond issue was amply covered by current asset alone, and was followed by common and preferred stock with a very large aggregate market value, taking their lowest quotations.

Graham comment:
In this instance, also, it would undoubtedly have been difficult to arrive at a fair valuation of the business; but it was quite easy to decide that this value in any event was far in excess of the company's debt.

和以上例子相同﹐雖然同樣是很難計算Owens-Illinois Glass Company的商業價值﹔不過﹐不管在什麼情況都能容易的知道它的價值是遠高于它的價格。

Example No.3:
In the Wright Aeronautical example

Graham comment:
the earlier situation presented a set of facts which demonstrated that the business was worth substantially more than $8 per share. In the later year, the facts were equally conclusive that the business did not have a reasonable value of $280 per share. It would have been difficult for the analyst to determine whether Wright Aeronautical was actually worth $20 or $40 a share in 1922--or actually worth $50 or $80 in 1929. But fortunately it was not necessary to decide these point in order to conclude that the shares were attractive were attractive at $8 and unattractive, intrinsically, at $280.

很難評估Wright Aeronautical1992年的價值是$20還是$40﹐或1929年是$50還是$80。很幸運的是不需要知道﹐就已經能了解當股價是$8是便宜﹐當$280的時候是不便宜。

Example No.4:
In the J.I. Case Company example

Graham comment:
The J.I. Case example illustrates the far more typical common-stock situation, in which the analyst cannot reach a dependable conclusive as to the relation of intrinsic value to market price. But even here, if the price had been low or high enough, a conclusion might have been warranted. To express the uncertainty of the picture, we might say that it was difficult to determine in early 1933 whether the intrinsic value of Case common was nearer $30 or $130. Yet if the stock had been selling at as low as $10, the analyst would undoubtedly have been justified in declaring that it was worth more than the market price.

J.I. Case Company是我們最常見到的例子﹐也就是我們無法知道它的可靠價值-價格的距離。雖然如此﹐只要股價偏低或偏高﹐我們還是可以做出結論。由于前景不明朗﹐我們可能無法估計1933年初它的價值是$30還是$130。但是只要股價偏低﹐例如$10﹐我們就可以認為價值是高于價格。


Flexibility of the Concept of Intrinsic Value
(SA﹐ Page 67)*

Our notion(概念) of the intrinsic value may be more or less distinct(與其他不同), depending on the particular(個別) case. The degree(程度) of indistinctness(不了解) may be expressed by a very hypothetical(假設的) "range of approximate(大慨的) value", which would grow wider as the uncertainty(不確定的)) of the picture increased, e.g., $20 to $40 for Wright Aeronautical in 1922 as against $30 to $130 for Case(J.I. Case Company) in 1933. It would follow that even a very indefinite idea of the intrinsic value may still justify a conclusion if the current price falls far outside either the maximum or minimum appraisal(評估).


*SA Sixth edition

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Speculation Not a Satisfactory Substitute For Investment

Speculation Not a Satisfactory Substitute(代替) For Investment
(SA, Page 12)

If the field of a sound investment has suffered a severe(嚴重的) contraction(收縮), as we suggested above, it would seem natural to turn our attention to intelligent(聰明) speculation(投機), on the theory that a good speculation is undoubtedly(真的) superior(優秀) to a poor investment. But here again we must recognize(承認) that the psychology of the speculator militates(影響) strongly against his success. For, by relation of cause and effect, he is most optimistic when prices are highest and most despondent(沮喪) when they are at bottom. Hence, in the nature of thing, only the exceptional(最卓越的) speculator can prove consistently(持續) successful, and no one has logical right to believe that he will succeed where most of his companions(同伴)must fail. For this reason, training in speculation, however intelligent and thorough(完善的), is likely to prove(證明) a misfortune(不幸的事) to the individual, since it may lead him into market activities, which starting in most cases with small success, almost invariably(總是) end in major disaster.

If investment is likely to prove unsatisfactory(不滿意) and speculation is certain to be dangerous(危險), to what may the intelligent student turn? Perhaps he would be well advised to devote(將) his attention to the field of undervalued securities-issues, whether bonds or stocks, which are selling well below the apparently(表面上) justified(有理由) by a careful analysis of the relevant(有關的) facts(事實). The opportunities(機會) in this direction have always been numerous(很多) and varied(各式各樣), and they are discussed at lenght in later chapters of this book. It is true that bargain hunting(覓購便宜貨) in securities is not without it pitfalls(陷阱), and in recent years especially it has been subject to many disadvantages(損失) and disappointments(失望). Yet under more normal condition it should yield satisfactory average results, and, most important of all, it promotes a fundamentally(重要的) conservative(保守) point of view, which should constitute(設立) a valuable(有價值的) safeguard(保護罩) againt speculative temptations(誘惑).

如果投資的回報嚴重不理想﹐如我們之前建議的﹐很自然的我們會注意到聰明的投機﹐理論上‘好的投機’的回報是真的好過‘差的投資’。但是﹐我們必須承認強烈影響投機客成功的是他的心理(精神)。有前因必有後果﹐他最樂觀的時候是當股價在最高點﹐最沮喪的時候是當股價在最低點。所以﹐很自然的﹐只有最卓越的投機客才能證明持續的成功﹐可是你又無法相信他會成功﹐因為他的同伴都失敗了。因為這個原因﹐練習投機﹐不管是聰明還是苦練﹐可以意料他將會不幸﹐當他在市場內買賣﹐只會在大部份買賣得到蠅頭小利﹐卻總是在大熊市中輸掉。

如果投資無利可圖﹐而投機又充危險﹐聰明人應該怎麼辦﹖也許他應該注意被低估的證券﹐只要是通過仔細的分析而且有數據相信股價是便宜的債券或股票。在這方面有很多機會而且各式各樣。當然﹐買便宜貨也會有陷阱﹐而且近年也反應了損失和失望。但在通常的情形下﹐它會產生滿意的平均回報﹐更重要的是﹐它代表了穩健和保守的態度﹐成為對投機的有效保護罩。

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

No Automatic Relationship between Value and Price

(SA, Page 12)

Investment theory should recognize(認識) that the merits(優點) of an issue(證券) reflect themselves in the market price not by any automatic response or mathematical relationship but through the minds and decisions of buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the investor mental attitude not only affects the market price but it is strongly affected by, so that the success of a commitment - properly considered - must depend in some part on the subsequent maintenance of a satisfactory market price. Hence in selecting an investment, even one presumably purchased for income only, reasonable allowance must be made for such purely market price elements as can be ascertained, in addition to the more primary consideration which is paid to factors of intrinsic value.

投資理論應該指出證券的價值並非自動﹑或者按照數學比率反應在市價﹐而是通過買賣雙方的心理因素來決定。買賣雙方的心理因素不只影響市價﹐而且也受到市價的強烈影響﹐所以成功的投資﹐必定是依賴部份隨後產生的好市價。所以選擇投資目標﹐即使是為了利息/股息﹐買入價也應該要能足夠補貼純心理因素會造成的股價變動﹐當成是對內在價值再額外補充。

The Factor of Human Nature

The Factor of Human Nature (人類的本性)
(SA, Page 11)

One of the striking feature(特色) of the past five years has been the domination(支配) of the financial scene by purely psychological(心理﹐精神) elements. In previous bull market the rise in stock prices remained in fairly close relationship with the improvement in business during the greater part of the cycle............................We suggest that this psychological phenomenon(現像) is closely related to the dominant importance assumed in recent year by intangible factor of value, good will, management, expected earning power, etc. Such value factors, while undoubtedly real, are not susceptible(可以) to mathematical calculation; hence the standards by which they are measured are to a great(大) extent(範圍) arbitrary(隨心所欲) and can suffer the widest variations(變化) in accordance with the prevalent(流行的) psychology


在過去5年﹐金融市場最大的特點就是被純粹的心理因素控制。在以前的牛市﹐股價的上漲和業務的改善有很大的關係................................我們認為這種心理因素﹐是因為過度注重在無形因素﹐如商譽﹐管理﹐未來盈利之類。這些因素﹐無可否認很重要﹐但是卻無法以數字計算﹔因為這些因素的標準﹐變化很大﹐而且隨著流行的變動而變動。


Preface(開場白)

SA(Securities Analysis)﹐Page vii

This book is intended(預期) for all those who have a serious interest in security value..............It deals not only with methods of analyzing individual issue(證券), but also with the establishment(建立) of general principle of selection and protection of security holdings.Hence much emphasis(重視) has been laid upon distinguishing(區別) the investment from the speculative approach, upon setting up sound and workable test of safety, and upon an understanding of the rights and true interests in senior securities and owners of common stocks.

Some matters of vital(非常重要) significance, e.g., the determination of the future prospects of an enterprise, have received little space(一點點), because little of definite value can be said on the subject.............Conversely(相反的) we have stressed(感受壓力) the technique of discovering(尋找) bargain issues(便宜貨) beyond its relative importance in the entire field of investment, because in this activity the talents(天才) peculiar(特別的) to the securities analyst find perhaps their most fruitful expression.....................

...........We are concerned chiefly with concepts(概念﹐觀念﹐思想), methods(方法), standards(標準), principle(原則), above all, with logical reasoning. We have stressed theory not for itself alone but for its value in practice. We have tried to avoid prescribing standards which are too stringent to follow, or technique methods which are trouble than they are worth.

..........For what we shall call fixed-value investment can be soundly chosen on if they are approached---in the Spinozan(荷蘭哲學家) phrase(警句)---"from the view point of calamity(災難)." In dealing with other types of security commitments, we have striven(努力) throughout to guard(看守) the student againts overemphasis(過份) upon(依靠) the superficial(表面) and temporary(短暫). Twenty years of varied experience in Wall Street have taught the senior author that this overemphasis is at once the delusion(迷惑﹐受騙) and the nemesis(報應) of the world of finance.

.....................


Benjamin Graham
David L. Dodd

May, 1934


************************************************
本書旨在滿足那些對證券價值有濃厚興趣的讀者........................內容不止包括了個別證券分析方法﹐還包括了對證券的選擇以及安全持有的普通原則。因此﹐重點會在于區分投資和投機﹐建立可靠的安全檢驗﹐以及了解權益和利益(債券/股票)。

有些非常重要的內容﹐例如企業的前景﹐卻討論不多﹐因為能表達前景的數字太少了。相反的﹐我們強調尋找便宜貨的技術﹐其實已經超越便宜貨的重要性﹐這是因為在證券分析有特別才華的人﹐往往在便宜貨的買賣得到很好的回報。

....................重要關注觀念﹐方法﹐標準﹐原則﹐特別是以上所有的邏輯關係。我們不是為理論而理論﹐而是為了它的實用價值。我們儘量避免太嚴格以至無法遵循的標準﹐或者徒勞無功的技術方法。

.....................我們所謂的固定價值投資是可以有效的﹐如果選擇的方法正確---以“居安思危”的觀念做選擇。其他的投資(股票等)﹐我們盡全力勸告讀者不要過份重視表面和暫時的現像(樂觀)。我在金融界的20年經驗﹐樂觀的後果是受騙和惡報。

Thursday, July 14, 2011

東方報業﹕價格上的分析

2009年﹐東方報業曾經進行私有化﹐但是失敗。

讓我回顧當時的情況

日期 ﹕22-5-09
收購價﹕0.95港元

當時的股價﹕0.82港元
溢價 ﹕15.9%


31-3-09﹐東方報業的財務狀況﹐

12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth

30-Mar-09 30-Mar-08 30-Mar-07 30-Mar-06 30-Mar-05 30-Mar-04 30-Mar-03 30-Mar-02 30-Mar-01 30-Mar-00
每股股東權益 1.16 1.16 1.08 1.05 1.14 1.12 1.06 1.01 0.92 1.17
每股淨流動資產 0.71 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.57 0.44 0.39
每股淨營運資本 0.68 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.38 0.31
每股盈利 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.02


以收購價作比較﹐當時的情況﹕
每股股東權益 82%
每股淨流動資產 134%
每股淨營運資本 140%
PE* 8.6

*平均盈利計算



那麼﹐現在的財務狀況﹐


12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth

30-Mar-11 30-Mar-10 30-Mar-09 30-Mar-08 30-Mar-07 30-Mar-06 30-Mar-05 30-Mar-04 30-Mar-03 30-Mar-02 30-Mar-01 30-Mar-00
每股股東權益 1.37 1.25 1.16 1.16 1.08 1.05 1.14 1.12 1.06 1.01 0.92 1.17
每股淨流動資產 0.91 0.79 0.71 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.57 0.44 0.39
每股淨營運資本 0.88 0.76 0.68 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.38 0.31
每股盈利 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.02
平均每股盈利 0.11
0.11









當時的收購價是否有提高的可能﹖
收購價﹕0.95港元

列表10﹕

2009年 現在
收購價 0.95 0.95
每股股東權益 1.16 1.37
每股淨流動資產 0.71 0.91
每股淨營運資本 0.68 0.88
每股盈利(平均) 0.11 0.11






每股股東權益 82% 69%
每股淨流動資產 134% 104%
每股淨營運資本 140% 108%
PE 8.6 8.6


淨營運資本 = NNCA
current asset - current liabilities - non current liabilities
(清盤價﹐不考慮固定資產)


根據當時的公開估價報告﹐當時的固定資產價值﹕


估價報告 估價報告 currency (估計)

Invest Cost 31-May-09 31-May-09 31-May-09 31-May-09

(千港元) (千港元) 千AD
(千港元)
東方報業中心 490,474 486,000

486,000
Aspire Hotel 112,441
11,700 6.3000 73,710
Rodeo Plaza 42,740
5,250 6.3000 33,075
35-39Bay Street 88,476
8,000 6.3000 50,400
541 Kent Street 95,249
11,000 6.3000 69,300
合計
829,380


712,485


日期 ﹕22-5-09
收購價﹕0.95港元

固定資產 = 712,485千港元 @ 每股0.297港元
(股數=2,397,917千股)

列表10顯示當時31-3-09﹐
每股淨營運資本=0.68港元


所以﹐當時東方的價值大約是
0.297港元(固定資產) + 0.68港元(NNCA)
=0.977港元


以0.95港元收購價來看﹐收購方的出價是精打細算過。
雖然平均盈利大約是0.11港元﹐可是連年下跌。
公司進行私有化﹐這樣的收購價﹐不算黑暗。

時光倒流﹐

日期 ﹕31-3-11
每股淨營運資本=0.88港元

固定資產價值﹕



估價報告 估價報告 currency (估計)

Invest Cost 31-May-09 31-May-09 14-Jul-11

(千港元) (千港元) 千AD
(千港元)
東方報業中心 490,474 486,000
(估計) 486,000
Aspire Hotel 112,441
11,700 8.376 97,999
Rodeo Plaza 42,740
5,250 8.376 43,974
35-39Bay Street 88,476
8,000 8.376 67,008
541 Kent Street 95,249
11,000 8.376 92,136
合計
829,380


787,117


我以31-May-09的估價報告計算固定資產價值﹐只是更新匯率。
2009年畢竟是受到金融風暴影響﹐所以可以估計當時地產價值沒有完全恢復。
以這個估價來評估現在﹐就不怕高估。

固定資產 = 787,117千港元 @ 每股0.328港元
(股數=2,397,917千股)

所以﹐現在東方的價值大約是
0.328港元(固定資產) + 0.88港元(NNCA)
=1.208港元

以14-7-11﹐東方的收市價=1.19港元
可以說是沒有margin of safety。


以東方宣佈派出0.11港元股息來計算﹐有9%yield
10年平均自由現金=0.106港元
今年自由現金=0.103港元

以它過去派息的歷史來看﹐算是9%yield﹐P/B=1﹐bond。

報章同行的業績﹐經過金融風暴﹐大致上都能恢復﹐當然無法和過去輝煌時代相比。
雖然科技日新月異﹐但是報章同行的業績在金融風暴前後﹐是顯得相當平穩的。
自由現金流簡單。

本金安全﹐並且每年得到9%yield﹐業務符合我的投資概念(能力圈)。

東方報業﹕財務上的分析

列表5﹕

股數 股東權益 商譽 有形股東權益 盈利 股息 自由現金 投資物業 租金收入
2000 2,194,259 2,576,306 0 2,576,306 42,817 (279,438)

2001 2,397,917 2,211,663 0 2,211,663 268,998 263,771 534,913

2002 2,397,917 2,432,513 0 2,432,513 303,328 215,813 526,900
2003 2,397,917 2,531,568 0 2,531,568 340,186 239,792 527,584
2004 2,397,917 2,692,824 0 2,692,824 438,797 335,709 366,871 0 2,422
2005 2,397,917 2,603,925 0 2,603,925 302,222 251,781 (15,637) 0 2,422
2006 2,397,917 2,512,937 0 2,512,937 126,583 119,896 258,302 142,211 4,573
2007 2,397,917 2,594,695 0 2,594,695 123,068 95,917 101,944 145,673 8,662
2008 2,397,917 2,781,403 0 2,781,403 311,586 263,771 452,859 69,472 18,835
2009 2,397,917 2,770,192 0 2,770,192 379,972 239,792 (3,494) 201,830 8,383
2010 2,397,917 2,989,397 0 2,989,397 307,492 269,123 255,985 4,989
2011 2,397,917 3,283,863 0 3,283,863 291,277 263,771 246,390 301,200 6,816


列表6﹕

有形股東權益








年初 年尾 增/減 3年檢驗 盈利 股息 盈利保留 3年檢驗 自由現金 3年檢驗
2001 1.17 0.92 (0.25)
0.11 0.110 0.00
0.22
2002 0.92 1.01 0.09
0.13 0.090 0.04
0.22
2003 1.01 1.06 0.04
0.14 0.100 0.04
0.22
2004 1.06 1.12 0.07
0.18 0.140 0.04
0.15
2005 1.12 1.09 (0.04) 0.02 0.13 0.105 0.02 0.04 (0.01) 0.12
2006 1.09 1.05 (0.04)
0.05 0.050 0.00
0.11
2007 1.05 1.08 0.03
0.05 0.040 0.01
0.04
2008 1.08 1.16 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.110 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.11
2009 1.16 1.16 (0.00)
0.16 0.100 0.06
(0.00)
2010 1.16 1.25 0.09
0.13 0.000 0.13
0.11
2011 1.25 1.37 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.110 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.07










合計 0.20

合計 0.38 合計 1.36



列表7﹕
12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth

30-Mar-11 30-Mar-10 30-Mar-09 30-Mar-08 30-Mar-07 30-Mar-06 30-Mar-05 30-Mar-04 30-Mar-03 30-Mar-02 30-Mar-01 30-Mar-00
EBIT/Sales 15% 17% 1% 15% 4% 4% 19% 24% 20% 11% 10% 4%
Net profit/EBIT 120% 117% 2545% 112% 191% 161% 76% 90% 84% 123% 106% 48%
Net profit/Sales 18% 20% 23% 17% 7% 7% 15% 22% 17% 14% 11% 2%
Sale/Total Assets 45% 48% 55% 61% 60% 65% 63% 65% 67% 78% 88% 76%
Total Assets /Sh. Equity 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2
ROE 8.9% 10.3% 13.7% 11.2% 4.7% 5.0% 10.9% 16.3% 13.4% 12.5% 12.2% 1.7%
ROA 8.2% 9.5% 12.7% 10.4% 4.1% 4.3% 9.3% 14.0% 11.5% 10.7% 9.5% 1.4%
RO Fixed Asset 24.7% 26.3% 33.3% 27.7% 9.1% 9.1% 17.2% 28.3% 28.2% 25.3% 20.6% 2.2%

列表8﹕
12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth

30-Mar-11 30-Mar-10 30-Mar-09 30-Mar-08 30-Mar-07 30-Mar-06 30-Mar-05 30-Mar-04 30-Mar-03 30-Mar-02 30-Mar-01 30-Mar-00
經營業務產生之現金 316,586 279,962 60,711 464,260 189,281 372,413 318,416 556,876 568,874 556,928 562,148 155,053
已付所得稅 (49,896) (11,372) (79,157) (41,628) (65,655) (61,237) (116,845) (88,844) (36,066) (14,742) (253) 0
退回所得稅 2,348 23,017 44,837 59,267 867 5,968 1,632 627 3,731 527 17,932 4,479
經營業務的現金流入 269,038 291,607 26,391 481,899 124,493 317,144 203,203 468,659 536,539 542,713 579,827 159,532
購買物業、廠房及設備 (21,418) (20,918) (21,607) (22,016) (17,511) (53,814) (215,356) (113,151) (8,955) (15,813) (27,235) (434,491)
自由現金 247,620 270,689 4,784 459,883 106,982 263,330 (12,153) 355,508 527,584 526,900 552,592 (274,959)
每股自由現金 0.103 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.04 0.11 (0.01) 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.23 (0.13)


列表9﹕
12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 12 mth 2H (6mth) 1H (6mth) 2H (6mth) 1H (6mth)

30-Mar-11 30-Mar-10 30-Mar-09 30-Mar-08 30-Mar-07 30-Mar-11 30-Sep-10 30-Mar-10 30-Sep-09
收益 1,589,356 1,567,277 1,637,522 1,835,604 1,798,808 776,346 813,010 809,812 757,465
所用原料及消耗品 (483,698) (464,248) (674,795) (620,224) (701,087) (256,898) (226,800) (219,967) (244,281)
毛利 1,105,658 1,103,029 962,727 1,215,380 1,097,721 519,448 586,210 589,845 513,184
毛利% 70% 70% 59% 66% 61% 67% 72% 73% 68%



  1. 列表5-6﹐2001年至今﹐股數沒有變動。股東權益和盈利保留能夠平衡。澳洲投資物業雖然不理想﹐不過仍然有租金收入。自由現金大約是平均0.10港元。
  2. 列表7﹐ROE是單位數﹐是大量庫存現金造成。
  3. 列表8﹐2009年的自由現金大量減少﹐因為收入大量減少。
  4. 列表9﹐最近兩年的每6個月收益﹐平平淡淡。