冤家局

合和公路基建（737）

粗略估计（因为只用4年数据分析）

Diluted No. of Shares =3,081,690（千股）
**（2,961,690+120,000)
E= 0.33港元
B = 3港元
股息 = 0.34港元
P = 4.52 港元

PE =  14
PB = 1.5
D% = 7.5%

Jun/09-Jun/12， 过去4年的业绩观察，加上业务的特色，盈利应该可以稳定，除非出现变化，例如收费率改变、使用率萎缩等等。

 Jun/09-Jun/12，营业额增加31%，但是盈利持平，原因是：

1. 税率增加，所以影响盈利
2. 西线2在Jun10启用，增加了集团的收入，但是西线2收入低于开销，西线2还在亏损。

以股票的角度，PE超过10倍，昂贵。

以REIT或business trust的角度，737的D%大约是7%，比较REIT或business trust的4-5D%，甚至国家债券，737好像镀层金。

外表，737是股票，不是REIT、business trust或债券。

内层，安全给以D%，到期不拆价，是可以当它是定息投资。

所以，只要符合条件，股票除了是股票，它也是定息投资。缺点在于没有法律规定和约束。

如果想吃息，就要用吃息的方法检验。
  
兵分四路

 1）損益帳
a)股息/盈利的比率 大约是1
b)股息/EBIT 大约是1.1倍
c) EBIT / financial cost 大约是15倍

2）現金流量表
自由現金/股息的比率大约是1.1倍

3）道路经营权，June 2027到期，离现在是10年
4）不清楚“小胡”的为人。
    但是“老胡”的为人应该可以，从以下几点可以看出来：

• Build-operate-transfer，“老胡”是务实的人
• 盈利全部派息 ，建造西线2和3的资本来自借钱。没有几个人可以做到这点。

以上4点，737勉强合格

如果再检验第5点， 
市值/债务 = 1.3倍，好像不合格。

债券法门：

以上5点全部合格

• 债券安全，所以股票安全

 以上4点合格，但是第5点不合格。
或以上 4点不合格

•  债券不安全，所以股票不安全

但是如果遇到冤家局，
 市值/债务 = 1.3倍，是假的，因为市场错了(miss price)，出了低价。
买入737就可以说是“投资中的投机”，一石二鸟，息价兼收。

是真是假，就看个人的艺术（努力、见识、胆识、幸运）了。

马后炮来讲，PE 10倍以下买入，就可以减少依赖艺术。

2012年﹐致牛欄股東信

牛太，牛女：

牛栏投资组合在2012年的表现如下，

股票组合的表现：
          帳面值     恒生指數   STI指數
2010   +8.9%         +5.3%       +10.1%
2011    -11.0%       -20.0%        -17.0%
2012   +25.1%      +22.9%      +15.1%


 收息组合的表现：
          帳面值     恒生指數   STI指數
2011      -0.4%       -20.0%        -17.0%
2012   +46.7%      +22.9%       +15.1%

收息组合主要是REIT、商业信托。

股票+收息组合的表现：
            帳面值     恒生指數   STI指數
2011      -1.0%       -20.0%        -17.0%
2012   +32.7%      +22.9%       +15.1%


回顾2011年的股东信，
總結起來﹐自從今年（2011年）八月開始﹐我的策略是﹕

1. 了解自己的能力
2. 了解能力以內的企業的基本數據
3. 挑選具備持續競爭優勢的企業
4. 以好價錢買入
5. 組合分成定息和股票

所以2012年，我在投资资产的分配
            股票      收息
2011      43%       57%       
2012      23%      77%     

当然，以上的分配不是在一天内完成的，而是摸索了6-7个月，逐渐形成的。

我是不是已经了解自己？
不，绝对不，了解自己能力的过程是永远无止境。

（1）
身是菩提树，心为明镜台。时时勤拂拭，勿使惹尘埃。

（2）
菩提本无树，明镜亦非台，本来无一物，何处惹尘埃。

就如以上的两首禅诗， 世人常赞叹第二首，说是大智慧，比第一首更高境界。就因为如此，我们是否就对第一首不肖一顾呢？有没有想过，可能第一首更适合自己？

我个人觉得，不要太在意方法是否出名， 最为重要的是适合自己的能力。
对一只牛来说，就选牛的方法吧。如果叫牛用龙的招数，恐怕......。如果只能渐悟，就不要强求顿悟。

Warren E. Buffett :
   To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a stratospheric IQ, unusual business insight, or inside information. What needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework.
   If you follow the behavioral and business principles that Graham advocates, you will not get a poor result from your investments. Whether you achieve outstanding results will depend on the effort and intellect you apply to your investment, as well as on the amplitudes of stock-market folly that prevail during your investing career.

以上几句是摘自巴菲特在Financial Analysts Journal, Nov/Dec 1976, 发表的文章，也是第四版“聪明的投资者”的序言。我个人体会是，

如果我们想要这世人最后是投资成功，秘诀是：

• 对的策略
• 信

这书（The Intelligent Investor）所说的就是对的策略，尤其是第8和20篇。

我个人认为“ keep emotions from corroding that framework”
无非就是“信”。如果你不相信这个策略，稍微风吹草动，你就会起心动念，朝令夕改。

想要达到标青的成绩，除了努力和聪明，还要看时势。
三者之间，应先专注在努力，其余的就相信一切都是好因缘。


时势即系你这一生能有几场金融风暴？
 When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.

我 个人认为，多阅读、多尝试（实验），在过程中了解自己，搜寻适合自己的方法。然后深入研究，再实验。你可能发现，之前适合自己的方法，很可能经不起考验； 你也可能发现，Graham所述的方法，仍然经得起检验；但是，你也可能发现，Graham所述的方法，再加上巴菲特和费雪（Philip Fisher）所述，的确是可以再改善。从种种过程中，最大的收获就是建立能力（competence ）。

2012 年，股票组合出现极大的变动，首先是套现恒隆地产，第二是减少股票的部位，增加收息的部位。原因在于当时的收息市场有利润，而且确定。虽然当时，我觉得股 票和收息的利润可能一样，但是收息却有先天的优势，例如透明和公开的派息政策，以及收息的来源主要是房地产收租，所以可预测和能确定。市价变动是市场的 事，我只要计算收息的价值，等待价值和市价的出现足够的差别。

套现恒隆地产的想法，是因为觉得建设银行和工商银行的市价很便宜，而恒隆地产的市价却合理。 把合理的，换成很便宜，只要是龙头换龙头，我觉得还是可以的。（说穿了，就是钱不够，才出此策）。
 

以上列表（16-7-12），再参考过去几年的业绩， 我个人认为是难得的便宜。龙头股的特征之一是对大势敏感，通常可以在一年之间，有所反应，例如下图所示：
 

 在6倍PE以下买入，仍然可能“暂时性亏损”，因为我们不可能知道市场疯狂到何等程度。只要组合经营完善，贡献合理的股息收入，我们是不必要理会账面值的“暂时性亏损”。胜利的契机在于：

• 对 “暂时性亏损”的容忍程度。成本便宜，容忍程度越高。龙头企业， 容忍程度越高。越了解企业的基本数据，容忍程度越高。 
• 耐心等待。龙头企业， 等待的时间就有可能缩短。

6倍PE的成本，我们极有可能面对“暂时性亏损”，更何况是10倍PE的成本？


2012年的投资策略仍然适合于2003年

 广储粮、高筑墙、缓称王

王子變青蛙﹐青蛙變王子

其實投資只是兩件事情：

1. 如何估計價值，
2. 是如何看待價格。

價值-價格的分離﹐就是說這回事。

但是﹐只是擅長投資﹐是否能得到高于平均的回報呢﹖
我認為﹐是有不妥當之處。
因為﹐除了價格變動﹐價值也會變動﹐可以增加﹐也可以減少﹐或者不變。

如果﹐我們估計A企業是價值›價格﹐而且距離足夠(例如50%)﹐但是價值大幅度萎縮﹐並且看來會長期萎縮下去﹐投資人是會蒙受嚴重損失。股市中﹐我們可以看到很多被KO的企業的例子﹐在KO之前﹐我們的確看到價值›價格維持了很長的時間。時間越長﹐損失就越大。

有些長期成長的B企業﹐也會業績逆轉﹐造成有利可圖的價值›價格的現像。但是突然管理層改組﹐而且管理方法變動﹐因此之前的價值﹐就有了問號﹖



那麼﹐

• 價值-價格的分離
• 盈利穩定
  

是否能更好呢﹖

盈利穩定的條件是什麼呢﹖
我們已經習慣的概念是以過去10年的紀錄作為參考﹐然後認為將來重複。我們的確小心異異﹐我們的確選擇了過去10年盈利穩定的企業。我們看來是掌握了不可勝的心態﹐我們也建立了堅定意志。但是在這一卻完美的條件下﹐似有不邏輯之處。因為﹐太完美了﹐我們不可能找到價值›價格的企業﹐就算有﹐也是微乎其微。或者﹐我們有不同的意見﹐例如﹐天上掉萬金的時候﹐我們是可以得到一些好機會。但是﹐我們會發覺﹐合理價格(fair price)佔大多數。至于有一定規模的價值›價格﹐它們都是受到經濟蕭條的波及而影響獲利﹐或者虧損。

這是quantitive approach的方法﹐也是我常用的方法。


如果碰上以下的狀況

1. Inadequate or Incorrect data
2. Uncertainties of the future
3. The irrational behavior of the market

我們是否能堅定認為盈利像以往般的穩定﹖

或者﹐我們需要更充份的了解盈利穩定的條件。

我個人就認為﹐盈利穩定是結果﹐單憑知道盈利穩定﹐在于亂市是不夠充足﹐就好像堅固的牆壁有一條看不見的裂隙。我們應該了解盈利穩定的來源﹐前因造就後果。如果以過去10年的盈利來判斷未來盈利會是穩定﹐似乎說服力不夠充足。

如果﹐來自Graham-Dodd Ville的人﹐都是能得到優秀于平均回報的人﹐並且在未來同樣能得到優秀于平均回報。

那麼﹐也應該有某些因素﹐讓這些企業的盈利﹐穩定于平均。


X

1. Hence this technique is more useful when applied to senior securities (which are protected against change) than to common stock;
2. more useful when applied to a business of inherently stable character than to one subject to wide variations;
3. in part, by favoring securities in which the popular interest is keen enough to promise a fairly swift response to value elements which he is the first to recognize;
4. more useful when carried on under fairly normal general conditions than in times of great uncertainty and radical change.
5. and proceeding with greater caution in times of abnormal stress and uncertainty.

讓我先討論X2
more useful when applied to a business of inherently stable character than to one subject to wide variations

參考1981年巴菲特的股東公開信﹕

In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.

1)
The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics:

1. an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume
2. an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital.

2)
The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise.


(恕我無法翻譯﹐我的低能力只會弄巧成拙)

巴老對于收購(買入)的對象分成兩類﹕
1)

1. 可以提高產品價格﹐並且不怕失去市場
2. 只需要少量成本就可以擴張生意
   

2) 由超級管理人領軍的企業


長期盈利穩定的企業﹐它可能是(1)或是(2)之類﹐當然也可能是(1)+(2)。
如果是(1)類﹐由一只牛管理﹐相信股東能睡好覺。
要是(2)類換成一只牛管理﹐股東會忐忑不安。


另一點﹐股價會變動﹐不是升﹐就是跌﹐要不然就是橫行。
不幸的﹐在99%跌的行情﹐組合中的股票﹐難免不跌。會不會升回去﹖
請想一想﹐
王子變青蛙﹐青蛙變回王子。
青蛙變青蛙﹐青蛙是青蛙。

We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.

(所以﹐天降黃金的時候﹐千萬記得尋找青蛙王子﹐而不是青蛙﹑田雞之類)


X3
in part, by favoring securities in which the popular interest is keen enough to promise a fairly swift response to value elements which he is the first to recognize

我只能比喻﹕

如果99%跌的行情﹐王子變青蛙。
但是10%起的行情﹐青蛙就變回王子。(或更早)

我認為這就是X3。


X4+5
more useful when carried on under fairly normal general conditions than in times of great uncertainty and radical change.
and proceeding with greater caution in times of abnormal stress and uncertainty.

我只能比喻﹕
不管怎樣﹐總是要小心翼翼。
情況越混亂﹐付出的成本就要細細(記得J.I. Case company的例子嗎﹖)



X1
Hence this technique is more useful when applied to senior securities (which are protected against change) than to common stock

senior securities﹕
A security (usually debt) that, in the event the issuer goes bankrupt, must be repaid before other creditors receive any payment.

Read more: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seniorsecurity.asp#ixzz1ZsnnTAIj

所以﹐以上種種因素(你也知道非常不容易找到X2類的企業)﹐價值法只能對債券或優先股才能有效。

令我驚訝的X1﹗

(1)

以價值法買入股票﹐並不是有效的方法﹐除非能具備X2﹑X3﹑X45的條件。

價值法的根據在于不變(protected again change)。

所以﹐我認為﹐過去的盈利穩定(紀錄﹐平均)﹐仍然是必需的檢驗﹐但是不能就這樣判斷將來的盈利穩定。至少得慎重考查X2﹐以下幾點是我從X2衍生出來的概念﹕

• 擁有核心事業﹐並且達到頂尖的競爭力
• 不會因為機會太少而餓死﹐懂得選擇機會
• 雖然犯錯但能自覺﹐先厚植實力﹐然後才行動
• 收入已經很久了是行業的10強之內﹐而且沒有衰退的跡象。(或者這類企業的市值是行業的10強之內)

• 不只是優秀﹐而是卓越(經過幾個景氣循環﹐仍能擠進行業的10強﹐擠進5強﹐再擠進3強)

我的概念雖然像烏托邦﹐但是檢查各行業的龍頭企業﹐有不少剛開始是沒沒無名之輩﹐經過幾代努力才雄霸一方。不是所有龍頭企業都有X2的因素﹐但擁有X2的因素都有機會成為龍頭企業。我認為﹐唯有在10強之內的企業﹐才有經過考驗的X因素。


一句話﹐便宜價買入不只是優秀而是卓越企業的股票。
(以青蛙價格﹐買入本來是王子的王子﹐同時具備X3﹑X45的王子)


(2)
我認為﹐唯有融合債券﹑優先股和股票的組合﹐才能把價值法﹐發揮淋漓盡致。

Intelligent investor﹐建議債券﹕股票的比率為75%﹕25%(或者50﹕50)﹐也建議股票便宜的時候﹐換成25%債券75%股票。我認為﹐非常值得參考。


債券或優先股就是為了利息收入。由此推論﹐有股息條約的REIT﹐也能算是債券之類。

只要認為組合的股票價格已經脫離現實﹐遠高于價值﹐而且感到熱血奔騰的時候﹐並且想要做點事的時候﹐可以賣出這個股票﹐買入債券﹐平衡回去債券-股票的比率。這個平衡分配比率背後的意義﹐就是要懂得﹕

• 投資
• 套利
• 守住財富

註﹕關於債券的買賣﹐當然是指符合價值法。

50%+X

Securities Analysis的第一章是“SURVEY AND APPROACH”﹐一定要閱讀﹐不管是賺錢還是虧損的時候﹐請一定要掃除掉樂觀或悲觀的心情﹐一定要閱讀。而且在這章的任何小節﹐有疑惑之處﹐是可以參考Intelligent Investor﹐再繼續下去。

A
In all of these instances he appears to be concerned with the intrinsic value of the security and more particularly with the discovery of discrepancies between the intrinsic value and the market price. In general term it is understood to be that intrinsic value which is justified by the fact, e.g., the assets, earnings, dividends, definite prospects.

價值-價格的分離是已經知道的事。

價值的四大來源--資產﹑盈利﹑股息和前景。

價值的正確數字﹐不是那麼的重要。

反而﹐最重要的是--足夠﹕

• 債券的保障
• 或股票的買賣--價值和價格的距離(多-少)

最重要的是--足夠


所有的前提﹐仍然是建築在正確的價值觀。至于如何建立正確的價值觀﹐有沒有例子可以參考﹖這章的例子﹕Wright Aeronautical﹐J.I. Case Company。
Intelligent Investor﹐有超過10個的例子。


到了這個階段﹐有可能是賺錢﹐也有可能是虧損。


Securities Analysis的第一章﹐某小節

B
Principal obstacles to success of the analysis :

1. Inadequate or Incorrect data
2. Uncertainties of the future
3. The irrational behavior of the market

以上的3個障礙﹐可以這樣說﹕

• The more questionable this assumption, the less valuable is the analysis.
• Hence this technique is more useful when applied to senior securities (which are protected against change) than to common stock;
• more useful when applied to a business of inherently stable character than to one subject to wide variations;
• and, finally, more useful when carried on under fairly normal general conditions than in times of great uncertainty and radical change.
  

In that portion of the analyst's activities which relates to the discovery of undervalued, and possibly of overvalued securities, he is more directly concerned with market price. For here the vindication of his judgment must be found largely in the ultimate market action of the issues. This field of analytical work may be said to rest upon a twofold assumption :

• first, that the market price is frequently out of line with the true value;
• second, that there is an inherent tendency for these disparities to correct themselves.

As to the truth of the former statement, there can be very little doubt.
(First assumption)

he second assumption is equally true in theory,

• but its working out in practice is often most unsatisfactory.

• Undervaluation caused by neglect or prejudice may persist for an inconveniently long time, and the same applies to inflated prices caused by over-enthusiasm or artificial stimulants.
  

The particular danger to the analyst is that, because of such delay, new determining factors may supervene before the market price adjusts itself to value as he found it. In other words, by the time the price finally does reflect the value, this value may have changed considerably and the facts and reasoning on which his decision was based may no longer be applicable.

he analyst must seek to guard himself against this danger as best he can :

• by dealing with those situations preferably which are not subject to sudden change;
• in part, by favoring securities in which the popular interest is keen enough to promise a fairly swift response to value elements which he is the first to recognize;
• by tempering his activities to the general financial situation--laying more emphasis on the discovery of undervalued securities when business and market conditions are a fairly even keel,
• and proceeding with greater caution in times of abnormal stress and uncertainty.

我個人認為﹐掌握了A階段﹐有可能是賺錢﹐也有可能是虧損﹐即係50﹕50的比率。
既然掌握的安全距離﹐只不過得到50%的勝算﹐不化算吧﹖
不過﹐也應該承認﹐有時候確是虧損﹐而且是成事實的嚴重虧損﹐所以認為有50%的勝算﹐即係50%會輸﹐是事實﹐就是事實。

那麼﹐勝算50%+X﹐有沒有可能﹖

我個人認為﹐X就在B階段。


X

• Hence this technique is more useful when applied to senior securities (which are protected against change) than to common stock;
• more useful when applied to a business of inherently stable character than to one subject to wide variations;
• in part, by favoring securities in which the popular interest is keen enough to promise a fairly swift response to value elements which he is the first to recognize;
• more useful when carried on under fairly normal general conditions than in times of great uncertainty and radical change.
• and proceeding with greater caution in times of abnormal stress and uncertainty.

The Hazard of Tardy Adjustment of Price Value

SA, page 69

In that portion of the analyst's activities which relates to the discovery of undervalued, and possibly of overvalued securities, he is more directly concerned with market price. For here the vindication of his judgment must be found largely in the ultimate market action of the issues. This field of analytical work may be said to rest upon a twofold assumption :

• first, that the market price is frequently out of line with the true value;
• second, that there is an inherent tendency for these disparities to correct themselves.

As to the truth of the former statement, there can be very little doubt.
(First assumption)


The second assumption is equally true in theory,

• but its working out in practice is often most unsatisfactory.

• Undervaluation caused by neglect or prejudice may persist for an inconveniently long time, and the same applies to inflated prices caused by over-enthusiasm or artificial stimulants.
  

The particular danger to the analyst is that, because of such delay, new determining factors may supervene before the market price adjusts itself to value as he found it. In other words, by the time the price finally does reflect the value, this value may have changed considerably and the facts and reasoning on which his decision was based may no longer be applicable.

The analyst must seek to guard himself against this danger as best he can :

• by dealing with those situations preferably which are not subject to sudden change;
• in part, by favoring securities in which the popular interest is keen enough to promise a fairly swift response to value elements which he is the first to recognize;
• by tempering his activities to the general financial situation--laying more emphasis on the discovery of undervalued securities when business and market conditions are a fairly even keel,
• and proceeding with greater caution in times of abnormal stress and uncertainty.
  

值得細讀再細讀﹐Value Approach的特點

The more questionable this assumption, the less valuable is the analysis.

Hence this technique is more useful when applied to senior securities (which are protected against change) than to common stock;

more useful when applied to a business of inherently stable character than to one subject to wide variations;

and, finally, more useful when carried on under fairly normal general conditions than in times of great uncertainty and radical change.

SA﹐page 69﹐Survey and Approach

Principal Obstacles to Success of the Analysis

Graham談quality approach的例子

SA, page 68

Needless to say, the analyst cannot be right all the time. Furthermore, a conclusion may be logically right but work out badly in practice. The main obstacles to the success of the analyst's work are threefold, viz.,

1) the inadequacy or incorrectness of the data
2) the uncertainties of the future
3) the irrational behavior of the market


1) Inadequate or incorrect data
.....although serious, is the least important of the three
.....Concealment is more common than misstatement
.....the analyst's experience and skill should lead him to note this defect and make allowance therefore

2) Uncertainties of the futures
A conclusion by the facts and by the apparent prospects may be vitiated by new developments. This raise the question of how far it is the function of security analysis to anticipate changed conditions.......It is manifest, however, that future changes are largely unpredictable, and that security analysis must ordinarily proceed on the assumption that the past record afford at least a rough guide to the future.

The more questionable this assumption, the less valuable is the analysis. Hence this technique is more useful when applied to senior securities (which are protected against change) than to common stock; more useful when applied to a business of inherently stable character than to one subject to wide variations; and, finally, more useful when carried on under fairly normal general conditions than in times of great uncertainty and radical change.


3) the irrational behavior of the market
In the sense the market and the future present the same kind of difficulties. Neither can be predicted or controlled by the analyst, yet his success is largely dependent upon them both.

The major activities of the investment analyst may be thought to have little or no concern with market price. His typical function is the selection of high-grade, fixed-income-bearing bonds, which upon investigation he judges to be secure as to interest and principal. The purchaser is supposed to pay no attention to their subsequent market fluctuations, but to be interested solely in the question whether the bonds will continue to be sound investments. In our opinion this traditional view of the investor's attitude is inaccurate and somewhat hypocritical. Owners of securities, whatever their character, are interested in their market quotations. This fact recognized by the emphasis always laid in investment upon marketability. If it is important that an issues be readily salable, it is still more important that it command a satisfactory price. While for obvious reasons the investor in high-grade bonds has a lesser concern with market fluctuations than has the speculator, they still have a strong psychological, if not financial, effect upon him. Even in this field, therefore, the analyst must take into account whatever influences may adversely govern the market price, as well as those which bear upon the basic safety of the issues.

In that portion of the analyst's activities which relates to the discovery of undervalued, and possibly overvalued securities, he is more directly concerned with market prices. For here the vindication of his judgment must be found largely in the ultimate market action of the issues. This field of analytical work may be said to rest upon a twofold assumption : first, that the market price is frequently out of the line with the true value; and, second, that there is an inherent tendency for these disparities to correct themselves. As to the truth of the former statement, there can be very little doubt.

(for interested reader, please continue read Intelligent Investor's The investor and market fluctuations, chapter 8, page 116)

The Concept of Intrinsic Value

(SA, Page 16)

Let us take an example from the field of common stock. In 1922, prior(之前) to the boom in aviation securities, Wright Aeronautical Corporation stock was selling on the New York Stock Exchange at only $8, although(雖然) it was paying a $1 dividend, had some time been earning earning over $2 a share, and showed more than $8 per share in cash assets in the treasury(資產). In this case analysis would readily have established(已確立的) that the intrinsic(內在) value of the issue(股票) was substantially(實質上) above the market price.

Again, consider the same issue in 1928 when it had advance to $280 per share. It was then earning at the rate $8 per share, as against $3.77 in 1927. The dividend rate was $2; the net-asset value was less than $50 per share. A study of this picture must have shown conclusively(確定的) that the market price represented(表示) for the most part the capitalization(資本額) of entirely(全部) conjectural(推測) future prospects----in other words, that the intrinsic value was far less than market quotation.

一只牛﹕

	A		B
	1922	1927	1928
股價	$ 8.00		$ 280
EPS	$ 2.00	$ 3.77	$ 8
Dividend	$ 1.00		$ 2
B	$ 8.00		$ 50
PE	4		35
PB	1		5.6
PExPB	4		196
Yield%	12.5%		0.7%

A﹕intrinsic(內在) value of the issue(股票) was substantially(實質上) above the market price.

B﹕the intrinsic value was far less than market quotation(股價).


從這個例子可以看到﹐Graham沒有說Wright Aeronautical Corporation的價值的數字﹐他沒有說﹐他只是說﹕

• 價值高過市價
• 價值少過市價

市價有數字﹐價值沒有﹐價值是感覺﹐只有經過數據的分析﹐才會有的感覺。


Intrinsic value vs. Price
(SA, Page 17)

From the foregoing(前述的) examples(例子) it will be seen(看來) that the work of securities analyst not without concrete results of considerable(值得考慮的) practical value, and that is applicable(看應用的) to a wide variety(各式各樣) of situations(情況). In all of these instances(實例) he appears(顯露) to be concerned(關於) with the intrinsic value of the security and more particularly(獨特的) with the discovery(發現) of discrepancies(差異) between the intrinsic value and the market price. We must recognize(認清楚), however(無論如何), that intrinsic value is an elusive(難以理解的) concept. In general(普通的) term(詞) it is understood(明白) to be that value which is justified(有正當理由的) by the facts(數據), e.g., the assets, earnings, dividends, definite(肯定的) prospects(前景), as distinct(與它不同的), let us say, from market qoatations(市價) established(被制定) by artificial(人造的) manipulation(操縱) or distorted(歪曲) by psychological excesses(過份行為). But it is a great mistake to imagine(想像) that intrinsic value is as definite(肯定的) and as determinable(可決定的) as is the market price. Some time ago intrinsic value (in the case of common stock) was thought(被認為) to be about the same thing as"book value", i.e., it was equal to the net assets of the business, fairly priced. This view(看法) of intrinsic value was quite(相當) definite(肯定的), but it proved(被證明) almost worthless(無用的) as a practical(實際) matter because neither(即不是) the average earning nor(也不是) the average market price evinced(顯示出) any tendency(傾向) to be governed(支配) by the book value.


從前述的例子來看﹐證券分析家除了分析出有效的價值﹐他的方法也必須能應用在各式各樣的情況。他的舉例除了顯露證券的價值﹐最獨特的是發現價值與價格的差異。我們要認清楚﹐無論如何﹐價值是難以理解的概念。簡單的說﹐價值的背後是數據﹐例如﹐資產﹐盈利﹐股息﹐肯定的前景﹐與它不同的﹐市場的價格是人可以操縱或被瘋狂歪曲。但是﹐認為市價等于價值﹐就大錯特錯了。以前﹐有人認為價值就是帳面值﹐即係企業的淨資產。這看法雖然沒錯﹐但是在事實上已經被證明行不通﹐因為不管是平均盈利﹐還是平均市價﹐沒有任何傾向是受到帳面值影響。


Intrinsic Value and "Earning Power"
(SA, Page 17)

Hence this idea was superseded by a newer view, viz, that the intrinsic value of a business was determined(被確定是) by its earning power. But the phrase(說法) "earning power" must imply(意味著) a fairly(公平) confident(信心) expectation(期待) of certain future results. It is not sufficient(充足) to know what the past earnings have averaged, or even that they disclose(透露) a definite line of growth or decline. They must be plausible(似真似假) grounds for believing that this average or this trend is a dependable(可靠) guide to the future. Experience has shown only too forcibly(有說服力) that in many instances this far from true. This mean that the concept of "earning power", expressed as a definite figure, and the derived(得到) concept of intrinsic value, as something equally definite and ascertainable, cannot be safely accepted as a general premise(假設) of security analysis.

之前已經說明價值不是帳面值﹐後來又有人說價值就是盈利能力。“盈利能力”一詞表示對未來業績的預測﹐而這預測有充份的數據支持。以前的平均盈利是不足以推算未來的盈利﹐也不能正確透露未來盈利的升跌。盈利的趨勢似真似假﹐對未來的推測是不可靠的。很多可靠的經驗和例子已經證明平均盈利和盈利的趨勢是不管用。以“盈利能力”的概念﹐計算出有數據支持的數字﹐來得到價值的概念﹐是一種可以也不可以﹐這種假設不能被證券分析接受。

Example :
To make this reasoning clearer, let us consider a concrete and typical(有代表性) example. What would we mean by the intrinsic value of J.I.Case Company common, as analyzed, say, early in 1933? The market price as $30; the asset value per share was $176; no dividend was being paid; the average earnings for ten years had been $9.50 per share; the results for 1932 had shown a deficit(虧損) of $17 per share. If we followed a customary(按慣例) method of appraisal(評估), we might take the average earnings per share of common for ten years, multiply this average by ten, and arrive at an intrinsic value of $95. But let us examine(檢查) the individual figures which make up this ten year average. They are as follow:

1932	$(17.40)
1931	$(2.90)
1930	$ 11.00
1929	$ 20.40
1928	$ 26.90
1927	$ 26.00
1926	$ 23.30
1925	$ 15.30
1924	$ (5.90)
1923	$ (2.10)
平均	$ 9.50

補充﹕
-1933年的市價=$30
-帳面值=$176
-沒有股息


This average of $9.50 is obviously(明顯) nothing more than an arithmetical(算術) resultant from ten unrelated figures. It can hardly be urged(極力主張) that this average is in any way representative of typical conditions in the past or representative of what may be expected in the future. Hence any figure of "real" or intrinsic value derived from this average must be characterized(描繪) as equally accidental or artificial.



以上是J.I.Case Company的10年盈利紀錄﹐那麼它1933年的價值是多少﹖
按照一般的算法﹐以10年平均盈利﹐乘以10倍﹐算到的價值是$95。

$9.50只是從10個無關聯數字計算出來的平均數字。很難說這數字代表了過去或預測未來。因此﹐任何從這個平均數字聯想到的價值﹐只是意外或者捏造出來的。


The Role of Intrinsic Value in the Work of Analyst
(SA, Page 18)

Let us try to formulate(用公式表示) a statement(報告) of the role(角色) of intrinsic value in the work of analyst which will reconcile(調解) the rather(而不是) conflicting(衝突) implications(涉及) of our various examples. The essential(要點) point is that securities analysis does not seek(尋找) to determine exactly what is the intrinsic value of a given security. It needs only to establish either that the value is adequate(足夠的), e.g., to protect a bond or to justify(證明) a stock purchase, or else that the value is considerably higher or considerably lower than the market price. For such purposes an indefinite(模糊的) and approximate(接近的) measure of the intrinsic value may be sufficient(足夠). To use a homely simile, it is quite possible to decide by inspection that a women enough to vote without knowing her age, or that a man is heavier than he should be without knowing his exact weight.

重點並非得到證券正確的價值。而是要證實的價值是否“足夠”﹐例如﹕
1) 債券有足夠的保障﹐股票有足夠買入的理由
2) 價值高于市價或低過市價(價值/價格的距離)

對于以上的目的﹐模糊或接近的價值數字已經是足夠的了。
估計女人的歲數並不需要知道她的正確年齡﹐是否是胖子也不需要知道他的正確重量。


Example No.1:
In 1928 the public was offered a large issue of 6% noncumulative preferred stock of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company priced at $100. The record showed that in no year in the company's history earnings been equivalent to as much as 1.5 times the fixed charges and preffered dividends combined.

Graham comment:
The rejection of St. Louis-San Francisco Preferred did not require an exact calculation of the intrinsic value of this railroad system. It was enough to show, very simply from earning record, that the margin of value above the bondholders' and preferred stockholders' claims was too small to assure safety.

我們不需要正確知道St. Louis-San Francisco的鐵路系統的商業價值﹐就已經可以拒絕買入它的優先股。因為從它的盈利紀錄就已經充足的知道﹐不管是對債權人還是優先股股東的權益保障﹐顯然是太小了。

Example No.2:
In June 1932 it was possible to purchase 5% bonds of Owens-Illinois Glass Company, due 1939,
a) at 70, yielding 11% to maturity.
b) The company earnings were many times the interest requirements--not only on the average but even at that time of severe depression.
c) The bond issue was amply covered by current asset alone, and was followed by common and preferred stock with a very large aggregate market value, taking their lowest quotations.

Graham comment:
In this instance, also, it would undoubtedly have been difficult to arrive at a fair valuation of the business; but it was quite easy to decide that this value in any event was far in excess of the company's debt.

和以上例子相同﹐雖然同樣是很難計算Owens-Illinois Glass Company的商業價值﹔不過﹐不管在什麼情況都能容易的知道它的價值是遠高于它的價格。

Example No.3:
In the Wright Aeronautical example

Graham comment:
the earlier situation presented a set of facts which demonstrated that the business was worth substantially more than $8 per share. In the later year, the facts were equally conclusive that the business did not have a reasonable value of $280 per share. It would have been difficult for the analyst to determine whether Wright Aeronautical was actually worth $20 or $40 a share in 1922--or actually worth $50 or $80 in 1929. But fortunately it was not necessary to decide these point in order to conclude that the shares were attractive were attractive at $8 and unattractive, intrinsically, at $280.

很難評估Wright Aeronautical1992年的價值是$20還是$40﹐或1929年是$50還是$80。很幸運的是不需要知道﹐就已經能了解當股價是$8是便宜﹐當$280的時候是不便宜。

Example No.4:
In the J.I. Case Company example

Graham comment:
The J.I. Case example illustrates the far more typical common-stock situation, in which the analyst cannot reach a dependable conclusive as to the relation of intrinsic value to market price. But even here, if the price had been low or high enough, a conclusion might have been warranted. To express the uncertainty of the picture, we might say that it was difficult to determine in early 1933 whether the intrinsic value of Case common was nearer $30 or $130. Yet if the stock had been selling at as low as $10, the analyst would undoubtedly have been justified in declaring that it was worth more than the market price.

J.I. Case Company是我們最常見到的例子﹐也就是我們無法知道它的可靠價值-價格的距離。雖然如此﹐只要股價偏低或偏高﹐我們還是可以做出結論。由于前景不明朗﹐我們可能無法估計1933年初它的價值是$30還是$130。但是只要股價偏低﹐例如$10﹐我們就可以認為價值是高于價格。


Flexibility of the Concept of Intrinsic Value
(SA﹐ Page 67)*

Our notion(概念) of the intrinsic value may be more or less distinct(與其他不同), depending on the particular(個別) case. The degree(程度) of indistinctness(不了解) may be expressed by a very hypothetical(假設的) "range of approximate(大慨的) value", which would grow wider as the uncertainty(不確定的)) of the picture increased, e.g., $20 to $40 for Wright Aeronautical in 1922 as against $30 to $130 for Case(J.I. Case Company) in 1933. It would follow that even a very indefinite idea of the intrinsic value may still justify a conclusion if the current price falls far outside either the maximum or minimum appraisal(評估).


*SA Sixth edition

Speculation Not a Satisfactory Substitute For Investment

Speculation Not a Satisfactory Substitute(代替) For Investment
(SA, Page 12)

If the field of a sound investment has suffered a severe(嚴重的) contraction(收縮), as we suggested above, it would seem natural to turn our attention to intelligent(聰明) speculation(投機), on the theory that a good speculation is undoubtedly(真的) superior(優秀) to a poor investment. But here again we must recognize(承認) that the psychology of the speculator militates(影響) strongly against his success. For, by relation of cause and effect, he is most optimistic when prices are highest and most despondent(沮喪) when they are at bottom. Hence, in the nature of thing, only the exceptional(最卓越的) speculator can prove consistently(持續) successful, and no one has logical right to believe that he will succeed where most of his companions(同伴)must fail. For this reason, training in speculation, however intelligent and thorough(完善的), is likely to prove(證明) a misfortune(不幸的事) to the individual, since it may lead him into market activities, which starting in most cases with small success, almost invariably(總是) end in major disaster.

If investment is likely to prove unsatisfactory(不滿意) and speculation is certain to be dangerous(危險), to what may the intelligent student turn? Perhaps he would be well advised to devote(將) his attention to the field of undervalued securities-issues, whether bonds or stocks, which are selling well below the apparently(表面上) justified(有理由) by a careful analysis of the relevant(有關的) facts(事實). The opportunities(機會) in this direction have always been numerous(很多) and varied(各式各樣), and they are discussed at lenght in later chapters of this book. It is true that bargain hunting(覓購便宜貨) in securities is not without it pitfalls(陷阱), and in recent years especially it has been subject to many disadvantages(損失) and disappointments(失望). Yet under more normal condition it should yield satisfactory average results, and, most important of all, it promotes a fundamentally(重要的) conservative(保守) point of view, which should constitute(設立) a valuable(有價值的) safeguard(保護罩) againt speculative temptations(誘惑).

如果投資的回報嚴重不理想﹐如我們之前建議的﹐很自然的我們會注意到聰明的投機﹐理論上‘好的投機’的回報是真的好過‘差的投資’。但是﹐我們必須承認強烈影響投機客成功的是他的心理(精神)。有前因必有後果﹐他最樂觀的時候是當股價在最高點﹐最沮喪的時候是當股價在最低點。所以﹐很自然的﹐只有最卓越的投機客才能證明持續的成功﹐可是你又無法相信他會成功﹐因為他的同伴都失敗了。因為這個原因﹐練習投機﹐不管是聰明還是苦練﹐可以意料他將會不幸﹐當他在市場內買賣﹐只會在大部份買賣得到蠅頭小利﹐卻總是在大熊市中輸掉。

如果投資無利可圖﹐而投機又充危險﹐聰明人應該怎麼辦﹖也許他應該注意被低估的證券﹐只要是通過仔細的分析而且有數據相信股價是便宜的債券或股票。在這方面有很多機會而且各式各樣。當然﹐買便宜貨也會有陷阱﹐而且近年也反應了損失和失望。但在通常的情形下﹐它會產生滿意的平均回報﹐更重要的是﹐它代表了穩健和保守的態度﹐成為對投機的有效保護罩。

No Automatic Relationship between Value and Price

(SA, Page 12)

Investment theory should recognize(認識) that the merits(優點) of an issue(證券) reflect themselves in the market price not by any automatic response or mathematical relationship but through the minds and decisions of buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the investor mental attitude not only affects the market price but it is strongly affected by, so that the success of a commitment - properly considered - must depend in some part on the subsequent maintenance of a satisfactory market price. Hence in selecting an investment, even one presumably purchased for income only, reasonable allowance must be made for such purely market price elements as can be ascertained, in addition to the more primary consideration which is paid to factors of intrinsic value.

投資理論應該指出證券的價值並非自動﹑或者按照數學比率反應在市價﹐而是通過買賣雙方的心理因素來決定。買賣雙方的心理因素不只影響市價﹐而且也受到市價的強烈影響﹐所以成功的投資﹐必定是依賴部份隨後產生的好市價。所以選擇投資目標﹐即使是為了利息/股息﹐買入價也應該要能足夠補貼純心理因素會造成的股價變動﹐當成是對內在價值再額外補充。

The Factor of Human Nature

The Factor of Human Nature (人類的本性)
(SA, Page 11)

One of the striking feature(特色) of the past five years has been the domination(支配) of the financial scene by purely psychological(心理﹐精神) elements. In previous bull market the rise in stock prices remained in fairly close relationship with the improvement in business during the greater part of the cycle............................We suggest that this psychological phenomenon(現像) is closely related to the dominant importance assumed in recent year by intangible factor of value, good will, management, expected earning power, etc. Such value factors, while undoubtedly real, are not susceptible(可以) to mathematical calculation; hence the standards by which they are measured are to a great(大) extent(範圍) arbitrary(隨心所欲) and can suffer the widest variations(變化) in accordance with the prevalent(流行的) psychology


在過去5年﹐金融市場最大的特點就是被純粹的心理因素控制。在以前的牛市﹐股價的上漲和業務的改善有很大的關係................................我們認為這種心理因素﹐是因為過度注重在無形因素﹐如商譽﹐管理﹐未來盈利之類。這些因素﹐無可否認很重要﹐但是卻無法以數字計算﹔因為這些因素的標準﹐變化很大﹐而且隨著流行的變動而變動。

Preface(開場白)

SA(Securities Analysis)﹐Page vii

This book is intended(預期) for all those who have a serious interest in security value..............It deals not only with methods of analyzing individual issue(證券), but also with the establishment(建立) of general principle of selection and protection of security holdings.Hence much emphasis(重視) has been laid upon distinguishing(區別) the investment from the speculative approach, upon setting up sound and workable test of safety, and upon an understanding of the rights and true interests in senior securities and owners of common stocks.

Some matters of vital(非常重要) significance, e.g., the determination of the future prospects of an enterprise, have received little space(一點點), because little of definite value can be said on the subject.............Conversely(相反的) we have stressed(感受壓力) the technique of discovering(尋找) bargain issues(便宜貨) beyond its relative importance in the entire field of investment, because in this activity the talents(天才) peculiar(特別的) to the securities analyst find perhaps their most fruitful expression.....................

...........We are concerned chiefly with concepts(概念﹐觀念﹐思想), methods(方法), standards(標準), principle(原則), above all, with logical reasoning. We have stressed theory not for itself alone but for its value in practice. We have tried to avoid prescribing standards which are too stringent to follow, or technique methods which are trouble than they are worth.

..........For what we shall call fixed-value investment can be soundly chosen on if they are approached---in the Spinozan(荷蘭哲學家) phrase(警句)---"from the view point of calamity(災難)." In dealing with other types of security commitments, we have striven(努力) throughout to guard(看守) the student againts overemphasis(過份) upon(依靠) the superficial(表面) and temporary(短暫). Twenty years of varied experience in Wall Street have taught the senior author that this overemphasis is at once the delusion(迷惑﹐受騙) and the nemesis(報應) of the world of finance.

.....................


Benjamin Graham
David L. Dodd

May, 1934


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本書旨在滿足那些對證券價值有濃厚興趣的讀者........................內容不止包括了個別證券分析方法﹐還包括了對證券的選擇以及安全持有的普通原則。因此﹐重點會在于區分投資和投機﹐建立可靠的安全檢驗﹐以及了解權益和利益(債券/股票)。

有些非常重要的內容﹐例如企業的前景﹐卻討論不多﹐因為能表達前景的數字太少了。相反的﹐我們強調尋找便宜貨的技術﹐其實已經超越便宜貨的重要性﹐這是因為在證券分析有特別才華的人﹐往往在便宜貨的買賣得到很好的回報。

....................重要關注觀念﹐方法﹐標準﹐原則﹐特別是以上所有的邏輯關係。我們不是為理論而理論﹐而是為了它的實用價值。我們儘量避免太嚴格以至無法遵循的標準﹐或者徒勞無功的技術方法。

.....................我們所謂的固定價值投資是可以有效的﹐如果選擇的方法正確---以“居安思危”的觀念做選擇。其他的投資(股票等)﹐我們盡全力勸告讀者不要過份重視表面和暫時的現像(樂觀)。我在金融界的20年經驗﹐樂觀的後果是受騙和惡報。

”普通股篇“之資本結構

當我重看“證券分析”債券篇關於債券檢驗的補充部份(relation of stock capitalization to bonded debt)﹐我的了解還是和以前一樣﹐心裡覺得不踏實。

沒想到﹐緣份來的這麼快。普通股篇最後第二章﹕資本結構(Capitalization Structure)﹐就有講解個中的奧妙。我發覺到﹐資本結構的講解對于了解債券-普通股之間的關係﹐有很大的幫助。

普通股市值 / 債券值的算術(招式)﹐每個人都能做到﹐但是它的意義(心法)﹐我不了解﹐這就是我心裡覺得不踏實的主因。


我的了解﹕

列表(1)

	企業 A	企業 B	企業 C
Earning	$1,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000
Bond Interest	$0	$250,000	$500,000
Earning for common stock	$1,000,000	$750,000	$500,000
Earning per common share	$10	$8	$5
Number of common share	100,000	100,000	100,000
5% Bond	$0	$5,000,000	$10,000,000
Earning for common stock	$1,000,000	$750,000	$500,000
PE ratio	10x	10x	10x
Value of common stock	$10,000,000	$7,500,000	$5,000,000
Value of Bond	$0	$5,000,000	$10,000,000
Total value of company	$10,000,000	$12,500,000	$15,000,000

以上三家企業是虛構的﹐它們的盈利同等﹐但是股東應佔盈利不一樣﹐這是因為它們的資本結構不一樣。

企業 A﹕資本全部來自股東
企業 B﹕股東資本+5百萬5%債券
企業 C﹕股東資本+1千萬5%債券

Graham雖然沒有說﹐不過很顯然得我們做如此想像﹐
5百萬5%債券 = 5百萬帶息貸款﹐年息5%
1千萬5%債券 = 1千萬帶息貸款﹐年息5%

我們買賣的股票﹐應該要說是公司才對﹐9成9都是以股東資本+貸款操作的。

問題(1)﹕
為什么三家企業的盈利同等($1,000,000)﹐但是企業價值卻不同等($10,000,000 ﹔$12,500,000﹔$15,000,000)﹖是不是不同的資本結構就可以任意改變企業的價值﹖
註﹕債券價值=面值
註﹕PE=10x


Graham﹕
我們需要小心謹慎處理﹐
債券價值=面值
PE=10x

是否合理﹖

大家可以計算﹐

	企業 A	企業 B	企業 C
Bond Interest coverage	No debt	4	2
Value of common stock / Value of Bond	N/M	1.5	0.5

別忘記我在“債券篇”說過的標準﹕

	標準
Bond Interest coverage	3
Value of common stock / Value of Bond	>1

企業B的Interest coverage4倍﹐我有理由相信它的債券可以達到面值﹐我也有理由相信債券的存在不會影響普通股以10倍盈利作交易價。我還要補充的是﹐如果普通股真的以10倍盈利作交易價﹐Value of common stock / Value of Bond顯示1.5﹐債券持有人也會覺得安全。

如果企業B的價值是合理的﹐那麼企業A呢﹖
某些人認為﹐企業A的PE應該超過10x。
不過﹐我(Graham)的看法是另一面的﹐

	Earn per share		Change in earning
Earning	企業 A	企業 B	企業 A	企業 B
$1,000,000	$10	$7.5	(Base)	(Base)
$750,000	$7.5	$5	-25%	-33%
$1,250,000	$12.5	$10	25%	33%

--如果聰明的投資者對來年的盈利很有信心﹐他會選擇企業B作為投資標﹐因為企業B顯示的盈利增長率高于企業A﹐企業B的股價增值將高于企業A。

我(Graham)認為﹕
企業A的價值引起爭論是因為資本結構過度簡單(oversimplification)。其實﹐企業A的價值應該和企業B同等﹐企業A的部份股票相等于企業B的債券﹐理論上兩者應該以相同標準估值﹐企業A的PE可以得到12倍。

但是在實際情況中﹐企業A的價值一般上不會實現$12,500,000。
原因是﹐市場中的買家極少數的人能夠識別出普通股中存在‘債券成份’﹔無論如何﹐他們都不需要這種‘債券成份’﹐也不願意為它支付額外的費用。

對于證券買家及公司管理員均同樣重要的原則﹕
對任何企業來說﹐最佳的資本結構中應該包含高級證券﹐並且能夠達至安全地發行及購買以作投資的程度。

佔在股東的角度看基本結構﹐企業B應該比企業A優勝﹐假設$5,000,000債券能夠於兩個情況下同時是有效的投資。(企業的net current assets超過$5,000,000)*

*
一只牛的了解是
Graham說的情況是指
情況1) Interest coverage
情況2) NCA/debt超過1﹐NCA=net current assets
補充﹕Value of common stock / Value of Bond超過1

如果企業B能作到這點﹐那麼企業A就顯示了過度保守的資本結構﹐因為它令股東們的投資回報﹐相比借入適量資本所獲得的回報更低。
為一個有利可圖及恰當的政策﹐能夠謹慎地利用一定數量的銀行貸款以滿足季節性的需求﹐而不是完全依賴私人資本來提供營運資金。


問題(2)﹕
企業C﹖

Graham﹕
如果你假設企業C
註﹕債券價值=面值
註﹕PE=10x

那麼你已經犯了嚴重的錯誤。

企業C的Interest coverage2倍是不足保障債券的安全﹐投資者以面值買入此債券是不聰明的。

如果投資者堅持認為業務有前景﹐投資能得到10%回報﹐可以透過銷售5%債券取回他們的全部資本﹐同時他們擁有企業的控制權以及盈利的一半。這種安排對經營者而言是非常吸引的﹐但對債券購買人來說卻是十分愚蠢。

企業C的債券顯然不值得$1,000,000。

所以我已經可以猜測企業C的整體價值可能會比企業B低﹐甚至比企業A低。

但是﹐市場先生有時候是很古怪﹐對企業C的出價﹐有時候比企業B﹑A更高。

對于資本結構﹐我(Graham)想表達﹕

企業A--過度保守 “over-conservative”
企業B--恰當 “suitable”
企業C--投機 “speculative”


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企業C是可以帶來大量投機利益﹐這點Graham有作講解。但這不是我原來的目的。

我是要弄清楚普通股-債券之間的關係﹐我已經達到目的了。

我終于明白了“Margin of Safety”說的普通股-債券之間的關係﹐而且能帶來投資利益﹗

請看下一篇文章。

當我們有疑惑時

<證券分析>2009年的中議本(天窗出版社)﹐共分成4卷。每卷都附上由某些現代投資人寫的導言。我形容某些現代投資人是因為我不認識他們﹐不過能被編輯請來寫文章﹐作為<證券分析>每一卷的序文﹐應該是有料的人。

第4卷的最後一篇導言﹐由一名叫Thomas A. Russo的人寫的﹐主要是解說環球投資的困難﹐文中的某些部份很有意思。我把它抄下來﹐和大家分享。


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..............1980年代﹐海外投資殊不容易﹔至少訊息披露方面﹐海外市場不如美國般透明﹐雙方的會計準則格格不入。想成為環球投資人要面臨的挑戰﹐包括企業管制﹑稅收﹑文化﹑政治﹑交易時間的不同﹑外匯﹑托管海外證券。何故要大費周章進行海外投資呢﹖.............因為大好機會少之又少﹐搜索範圍過于狹窄就得不到最佳的投資。

...............對特定行業深入了解﹐讓投資者在自己熟知的範圍內﹐評估境內外的機會。各國口味和法律可能存在差異﹐但大多數產品和服務的生產﹑推廣和分銷等經濟學根本﹐卻是不分疆界的。

...............實際上﹐Graham和Dodd﹐以及巴菲特都擔心某些管理層可能緊緊抓住公司的資產不放﹐拒絕派息﹐進行一些似乎只為增加管理層名望和薪酬的併購。這正正解釋為什麼巴菲特要尋找有長遠保障﹑提昇經營專利﹐並首重公司資本分配過程效率的管理人員。..............僅管文化和語言差異﹐但我們可以管理層長期紀錄﹐根據你了解的行業最佳守則﹐可以判斷他們以往決定的對錯。

....................擁有強大經營專利的簡單業務﹐為境外投資者提供額外的保障。


會計標準..................當我第一次開始海外投資時﹐有美國投資者問我﹕“外國公司的會計帳面可以信賴嗎﹖”我那就回答說﹕“和什麼相比呢﹖”雖然外國的會計標準尚有很多不足之處﹐但實際上﹐它們有時候比美國會計更加保守。同時﹐我們引以為豪的標準﹐也沒使我們避過Anron和Worldcom會計醜聞。

無法獲取的資訊.............仔細就讀公司的報告﹐可發現管理層重視股東﹑經營謹慎。..........要求更高的安全邊際﹐始終有個限度。


投資者對家族控股公司心存偏見﹐亦是股價如此便宜的另一原因。投資者常怕公司的家族成員﹐可能會對股價漠不關心﹐或會將資產轉移至其個人利益之上。有趣的是.............如果你的利益能與一個誠實的家族聯繫起來﹐那麼家族控制實際上帶來更好而不是更糟的。

............管理層不愛與投資者打交道﹔除規定的半年和全年財務報告外﹐公司鮮有新聞發佈。............事實上﹐主席在年報的致股東信中﹐已提供大量投資者想要的資訊。


雖然難以接觸的企業﹐會使許多投資者退卻﹐但我欣賞其管理層專注于公司營運前景﹑讓業績替其說話的做法。這些年來﹐我沒見過有任何內部交易。



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一只牛的看法﹕


其實﹐在這個時代﹐我們同樣無法避免要面對各種不確定的事。最近就有個例子﹐經濟日報集團斥資購入報章印刷設備。再想一想﹐通告披露購買設備的理由也太過簡單了吧﹐“配合業務進一步擴充及發展，並確保報章發行之生產暢順。”

經濟日報集團的股東權益有7億港元﹐從裡頭拿８,６１４萬港元購入設備﹐股東權益減少了11%﹐不是小事吧﹖業績報告記載的物業、廠房及設備值得22,867千港元﹐加入新設備﹐意味設備的價值提昇了39%﹐那麼生產能力提昇多少呢﹖什麼產品供不應求﹖何時投入生產﹖真讓人有無限想象空間﹗


會計標準..................當我第一次開始海外投資時﹐有美國投資者問我﹕“外國公司的會計帳面可以信賴嗎﹖”我那就回答說﹕“和什麼相比呢﹖”Thomas A. Russo

2010年﹐越秀交通購買兩條高速公路﹐通告附上了第3者的評估﹐有關于30年的交通流量預測﹑現金貼現回報率。基本的﹑不深入計較的﹑不查證下﹐我們從現金貼現回報率﹐就已經有了概念﹐稍微知道這個投資是否OK嗎﹖我們看得出管理層肯用心編‘故事’。

相隔了6年沒有增添任何固定資產﹐在2009-2010年之間﹐激成突然購買美國酒店和日本產業。這市值小小的家族企業竟然也會透露購入產業的資訊﹐至少我能大慨算出投資回報。當然資訊的可靠和保障是另一回事﹐至少管理層肯用心編‘故事’。

First REIT是一間在新加玻上市的印尼REIT﹐它的產業很特別。它把醫院出租給專業的集團﹐它的收入是租金而不是醫療服務費。所以投資者是不需要專業醫生知識﹐只要懂得計算回報即可。First REIT的股息回報一直以來是新加玻所有REIT中最高中前3名內﹐達到8%以上。而新加玻火紅的REIT﹐平均股息回報只有4~5%。它們股息差異之大﹐我想原因在于印尼是政治風險高的國家。最近﹐First REIT為了擴張所以想要買入兩家醫院產業然後再出租出去﹐就進行right issues﹐價格是0.65P/B﹐股息率12%。

雖然First REIT來自落後的印尼﹐不過它的proposal﹐寫得非常詳細和用心﹐很清楚說明租金和條件﹐輕易就能算出這項產業的ROI=12%﹐股東的股息將提高成xxx﹔proposal附上第3者的研究報告﹐說印尼缺乏高水準的私人醫院﹐人民收入比以前高很多﹐現代病開始多了﹐所以高水準的私人醫院的需求是很大的。我心裡想﹐出租醫院產業很穩定﹐專業醫療的集團的收入來源因為環境需要所以可靠性很高。當時的股價yield有8%﹑1.0P/B的水平﹐而且是First REIT近年的高價位。如果在這個價位買入並且得到right entitlement﹐全部本金將會有9%yield﹐0.96P/B。後來順利的﹐公司的right issues很成功的完成﹐恢復正常後的今天﹐投資本金的股息回報果然提昇成9%﹐而且平均股價還增值了8%。回想起來﹐我相信股東對有品質的proposal的開支應該沒有怨言吧。得到回報的投資者勇氣是來自﹐

• 擁有強大經營專利的簡單業務﹐為投資者提供額外的保障
• 要求更高的安全邊際﹐始終有個限度。
  

(當然﹐對First REIT的現金流﹑利息保障﹐都能通過Graham教導的檢驗)


所以啊﹐當我們有疑惑時﹐更要多用心﹑更專注于﹐
概念﹑方法﹑標準和原則﹔
最重要的是﹐一切合乎邏輯的推理

價值和價格的概念﹐Graham + Buffett

1) 巴菲特對價值和價格的概念

巴菲特在1983年Chairman's letter(Appendix,'Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities')舉了一個購買‘See’ 企業的例子﹐我們可以發覺巴菲特對價值和價格的概念。

	‘See’ 企業
帳面值	800
盈利	200
買入價	2,500

巴菲特解析他買入的原因﹕

盈利/帳面值	25%
投資回報	8.0%

他認為以投資回報8%﹐買入持續(consistently)賺取高達25%的盈利/帳面值的企業﹐是合理的。(盈利/帳面值是需要經過多年考驗才能算是擁有‘持續性’。)


巴菲特另外舉了一個反面例子﹕

	‘See’	A
帳面值	800	1800
盈利	200	200
市價	2,500	X
R/帳面值	25%	11%
投資回報	8.0%

他說﹐有一間企業(A)﹐雖然擁有200美元的盈利﹐但是它的盈利/帳面值只有11%﹐這是因為它需要1800美元的有形資產來維持營運。
巴菲特認為企業(A)的價格只能相當于它的帳面值-1800美元。只有投資回報=11%才能勉強彌補帳面值報酬率的不足。雖然巴菲特認為企業(A)的價格當于1800美元﹐但他認為這並不是個好投資。因為企業(A)的投資回報-11%﹐只是3%高于‘See’ 企業﹐但是R/帳面值11%卻是大量少于See企業的25%。

	‘See’	A
帳面值	800	1800
盈利	200	200
市價	2,500	1800
R/帳面值	25%	11%
投資回報	8.0%	11%

雖然‘See’ 企業的盈利不比企業(A)多﹐而且資產也不及企業(A)的一半﹐但是巴菲特還是敢敢花了2500美元買下‘See’ 企業。

2) Graham對價值和價格的概念
我相信﹐如果Mr.Graham在世﹐恐怕是無法苟同這點。這其中的緣故在于﹐Graham認為買價高于
帳面值﹐多付的Goodwill會減少投資回報﹐如以下﹕

	‘See’	A
帳面值	800	1800
盈利	200	200
買入價	2,500	1800
Goodwill	1,700	0
分20攤每年的Goodwill	85	0
減Goodwill後的盈利	115	200
投資回報	4.6%	11.1%

如果計入goodwill charge﹐投資回報卻顯示了極大的差別﹐Graham認為企業(A)才是正確的選擇。


3) Buffett的解析

巴菲特說他得到的教訓是﹕

1) 這是投資﹐並非會計
如果企業能夠利用淨資產創造出遠高于市場平均的盈利﹐這個企業的整體價值就會超過其帳面值。超出市場平均的部分盈利﹐是企業的無形資產創造出來﹔無形資產等于其帳面值與整體價值的相差。

會計原則規定﹐在這些收購案(投資買入)中創造出來的無形資產﹐企業每年必須從盈利扣除一定的費用加以攤銷。(這就是Graham處理方式)。

但是﹐每年從盈利扣除的攤銷費用﹐是否表示企業的無形資產將每年減少至零呢﹖企業的無形資產真的減少嗎﹖如果無形資產真的減少﹐為何多年來企業能夠創造出遠高于市場平均的盈利﹖

過了幾年﹐‘See’企業利用2000美元的帳面值賺取了1300的盈利﹐盈利/帳面值=65%﹗﹐比起當初的25%﹐增加了40%。說明了企業的無形資產並沒有減少﹐反而有增加的現像﹔或無形資產盈利能力增加了。

如果我們計算企業的價值﹐利用會計原則規定﹐從盈利扣除的攤銷費用﹐恐怕我們就會低估企業的盈利能力﹐犯了錯誤。

投資的原則﹐除了避免損失﹐還要避免犯錯誤﹐我相信是要兩者兼顧的。

2) 通貨膨脹
只要你認為這個世界會持續出現通貨膨脹(這是肯定的)﹐如果價格水準上漲了1倍﹐會對‘See’ 或(A)公司產生了什麼影響﹖

兩家企業都必須把盈利提昇至400美元﹐以便可以跟得上通貨膨脹的腳步。如果想要產生這樣的結果﹐這兩家公司對有形資產的投資或許也需要增加1倍。

See's 公司只擁有價值800美元的有形資產就能賺取了200美元。因此簡單的說﹐See's 公司只需要再投資800美元﹐就能賺取了400美元。(想象擁有兩家See's 公司)。

同樣的﹐(A)公司也需要再投資1800美元﹐才能賺取了400美元。然而﹐(A)公司的資金負擔卻高過See's 公司的2倍。

當(A)公司的盈利達到400美元﹐(A)公司的市場價值可能還是跟其擁有的有形價值一樣﹐大約是1800+1800=3600。也就是說﹐(A)公司的股東每多投資一塊錢﹐也只能夠多獲得一塊錢的價值。(這種1:1的投資結果﹐正如同把錢存入銀行戶口的結果一樣。)

See's 公司的盈利也是400美元﹐但如果我們用當初購買See's 公司所用的標準來評估該公司的當前價值-3倍帳面值(這是一種很合理的做法)﹐See's 公司現在的價值可能高達2500+2500=5000美元。也就是說﹐股東的每一塊錢的投資可以獲得三塊錢的價值。

1. 因通貨膨脹所需的投資並不會提昇投資回報率﹐投入這些資金的動機﹐只是要讓事業繼續生存下去﹐而不是為了股東利益著想。
2. 對有形資產需求較少的企業﹐受通貨膨脹傷害的程度也會較低。
3. 在通貨膨脹時期﹐唯有無形資產才能夠不斷創造價值。

3) Buffett的經濟無形資產
巴菲特說他對無形資產的看法﹐如以下

1. 如果我們計算企業的價值﹐利用會計原則規定﹐從盈利扣除的攤銷費用﹐恐怕我們就會低估企業的盈利能力﹐犯了錯誤。
2. 對有形資產需求較少的企業﹐受通貨膨脹傷害的程度也會較低在通貨膨脹時期﹐
3. 唯有無形資產才能夠不斷創造價值。

巴菲特稱以上為經濟無形資產。(Economy Goodwill)
(我喜稱為有用的無形資產)


經濟無形資產的形成﹐必需的條件是﹕
合理價格買入企業

反面說詞就是某個過于興奮的管理層以過高的
愚蠢價格收購了一家企業。由于這項愚蠢的收購價無處可去﹐最後只得落腳到會計的無形資產的項目上。

我們回顧當初巴菲特購買‘See’ 企業﹐

	‘See’ 企業
帳面值	800
盈利	200
買入價	2,500

盈利/帳面值	25%
投資回報	8.0%

我看到巴菲特考慮合理價格時﹐以下的條件是堅定不能妥協的
先 ---盈利/帳面值
後 ---投資回報

盈利/帳面值要高于投資回報
以‘A’ 公司的例子﹐雖然‘A’ 公司投資回報高于‘See’ 公司(11%vs8%)﹐但是盈利/帳面值卻低(11%vs25%)﹐所以巴菲特選擇了‘See’ 公司。

投資回報﹕巴菲特沒有特別說明。
(我大膽認為﹐巴菲特應該記得Graham的教導﹐投資回報不能少于5%)



現在﹐我應該選擇Graham還是Buffett?作為我對企業合理價的分析基礎呢﹖

我認為分清界線是無益的。


總結

我認為﹕
1) 盈利
2) 帳面值
應該堅定遵守Graham的教導﹐

3) 盈利/帳面值
4) 投資回報
則採用Buffett的概念﹐不必計入goodwill charge﹐但需要

• 盈利/帳面值高于投資回報﹐盈利/帳面值高于20%(盈利/帳面值9%﹐投資回報8%﹐是沒有意義的。)
• 投資回報高于8%。

投資普通股的方法

當初我得到了證券分析﹐立刻跳過第1部分﹑第2部分﹐興致勃勃看第3部分證券分析之普通股的投資理論﹐希望能得到投資股票的秘訣。
(第1部分+第2部分﹐書的厚度大約2寸﹐字小如普通螞蟻﹐沒有可愛的圖片。)

證券分析之普通股的投資理論分成兩大部分﹕
1。普通股投資理論﹕股息因素 (27章-30章)
2。收益帳戶分析﹕普通股估值的盈利因素 (31章-41章)

第27章的題目是普通股投資理論﹐Mr.Graham討論了以前和那時候的各種投資理論。

第28章的題目是普通股投資的新準則。
(這時候﹐我心底暗想什麼新準則﹖這本書時沒有100也有80歲﹐現在還能用嗎﹖)


Mr.Graham認為比較合適的普通股分析方法﹐有三個﹕

1. 以長期擴展作為基準。
2. 企業的盈利能夠增長作為基準。
3. 以安全邊際原則作為選擇基礎。

以長期擴展作為基準
以長期擴展作為基準能否成功及可靠的投資股票﹐必須假設在國家的經濟發展過程中﹐某些基本的和早已形成的基礎是可靠的。
(a) 國家的福利和盈利能力將持續增長﹔
(b) 這種增長將反映于主要社會企業的資源和利潤增長上﹔
(c) 這種增長主要是由新增資本的投資和未分配盈餘再投資所帶來。強調累計盈餘和未來盈利的因果關係。

因此﹐股票的選擇並非純粹靠運氣或憑空猜測﹐而是受制于對過往的交易紀錄的分析﹐及與現在股價的關係。

如果(a-c)的條件存在﹐那些過去有非凡表現的股票﹐將和以前一樣﹐表現非凡。

對于經濟周期的波動和不穩定﹔
前者要堅持以合理價格進行每一項交易來加以防範﹔
後者可以通過小心選擇﹐以及廣泛分散投資來化解。


企業的盈利能夠增長作為基準
這個方法強調優良的企業會有穩定的增長。當確定了這些公司﹐便可有信心地買入這些公司作長線投資。

這方法的三個問題﹕
(a) 何謂‘增長型企業’﹖
增長型企業的壽命有多長﹖以前﹑現在﹐經濟蕭條後﹐很多曾是增長型企業企業未能復元。
所以增長型企業也一樣有生命週期﹐我們如何確定它的表現何時結束﹖

(b) 投資者能否發掘它們﹖
假設我們選擇經歷過不同商業循環後有所提昇的企業﹐這預示企業即將進入另一個衰退期。如之前提到的增長型企業也一樣有生命週期。

假設我們選擇擴展紀錄較短的公司﹐我們需要冒著被短暫性繁盛蒙騙的風險。

鑒定增長型企業不能單靠統計及數據﹐更需要大量的專門性研究及商業判斷。

要成功並非無可能﹐但這工作並不容易。
(一只牛﹕成功的投資確實不容易)

(c) 股價高估了企業發展潛力﹖
被理解為有前景的股票通常以較高價格售出。但投資者如何識別價格是否過高﹖

投資者一旦為這個增長因素而付出太多的價格﹐他將會承擔更多風險﹔增長若少于預期﹐他的付出將多于他得到的﹔在一段相當長的時期內﹐市場對于這股票的評語將較他悲觀。

假設投資者選擇自己認為樂觀的公司﹐致力避免對未來前景而付出昂貴的溢價﹐即使那些公司並不特別收市場歡迎。無疑﹐這種方式如果有效的話﹐將證明最有利可圖。但是﹐這只是代表有主見及勇于冒險的個人投資活動﹐而不是按照規則及標準去進行投資。

以企業的盈利能夠增長作為基準的方法﹐是可以成功﹐也可以稱呼為“投資”﹐但必需具備以下因素﹕
第(1) 應抱著真正關心及完全的懷疑態度﹐以審視影響未來的因素。
第(2) 合理的支付價格。



以安全邊際原則作為選擇基礎
方法(1) ﹕在市場低迷時﹐選擇買入具代表性及活躍的證券。
方法(2) ﹕發掘個別被低估的股票﹐即使市場並非特別低迷。

安全邊際主要反映于股票正以低于其最低的內在價值進行銷售。

至于如何處理危機及心理因素﹐以上的方法卻有不同的處理方式。


方法(1) 的運作﹕

1. 選取不同行業的龍頭股。
2. 利用適合數據內與現行長期息率相關的平均盈利﹐去估值股票的基本或普遍價值。
3. 將買入點定在低于普遍價值某個百分比的位置﹐賣出點則設于這個價值的某個百分比之上。

方法(1) 的缺點﹕

1. 市場行為的一般模式雖然可以預期﹐但也許會錯誤地選取買入及買出點﹐或極端的情況下錯失機會。
2. 市場行為的特點就是會出現大改變﹐以往有效的交易方式可能現在不行了。
3. 需要相當大的個人毅力﹔如不認同市場普遍想法﹐堅持相反的進行買賣﹔股票在買入後下跌﹐沽出後回升﹔大部分人進行股票買賣時﹐投資者卻需要選擇此時遠離股票市場。
   

方法(2) 的運作﹕
創辦已久﹐財政穩健﹐在行業內舉足輕重﹐未來持續維持盈利﹐但受到股市歧視(尤其是盈利低于正常水平的年度)﹐並且以大幅低于價值的價格出售。價值的主要因素是﹕

1. 股息。
2. 盈利能力。
3. 資產。

在避免了資本損失﹐安全的領取滿意的股息。
由于買入股票的價格非常低﹐市場的情緒大幅度波動仍然無法把股價推下比買入價格更低的水平﹔由于股票的盈利能力恢復于正常水平﹐未來持續維持盈利﹐持續派發令人滿意的股息﹐由于買入股票的價格非常低﹐造成股息回酬非常好。

這時候﹐股價的增值反而是次要了﹐因為投資者已經從股息得到回酬。


Mr.Graham強烈傾向相信以安全邊際原則作為選擇基礎中的方法(2) ﹐是有效的方法去探究真正的投資機會。


一只牛﹕
我發覺現在的投資方法﹐和80年前Mr.Graham所說的有許多相同之處。
以長期擴展作為基準﹕如我們現在的中國概念﹑新興市場概念
企業的盈利能夠增長作為基準﹕現在的我們都對增長股大方的付出高價。
以安全邊際原則作為選擇基礎﹕如巴菲特.....

我對安全邊際原則仍然有許多不明白﹐需要很多很多的磨煉。

未來

‘證券分析’第4章[區別投資與投機]﹐162頁

不論投資還是投機﹐都必需經歷未來的考驗。


對于投資而言﹐我們需要防範[未來]﹐但非從中取利。未來市場若增長﹐那會更好。但就投資本身而論﹐不能側重對市場增長的憧憬。

而所謂投機﹐其根據及理由往往源自對將來發展的憧憬﹐這些未來發展動向可能與過往表現不同。

投資與投機

根據‘證券分析’第4章


投資定義建議﹕
投資操作是指經過透徹的分析後﹐確保本金安全﹐並能獲得滿意回報的活動。不符合這些標準﹐就是投機。

操作是說﹐要達到投資的最低要求﹐必需分散投資以降低個別證券的風險。


[透徹的分析]是指根據已確立的安全和價值標準進行研究。如果渣打的股價是最高盈利紀錄的40倍﹐只因前景秀麗而建議投資﹐這種的[分析]談不上透徹﹐因此應被排除在外。

[確保安全]是指投資並沒有絕對或徹底的安全﹐所指的是在一般情況或變動時可起保護作用﹐以免遭受損失。如果根據研究結果和經驗﹐識別出會有很大機會導致損失﹐仍考慮買入﹐那便是投機。

[滿意回報]具有主觀成分﹐回報無高低﹐只要投資者願意接受﹐就能成立。


嚴格來說﹐世上並無絕對的‘投資類證券’。除了[質量]外﹐投資時必需考慮證券的[價格]。價格暴漲得連大部分實力雄厚公司的股票于大部分時間都必需視為投機。所以股票(甚至是債券)在某一個價格具有投資價值﹐在另一個價格卻有不然。

Mr.Graham 作出以下建議﹕

1. 分析員投資﹕所指的操作都經過透徹研究﹐能確保本金安全﹐並能或得充足回報。
2. 理性投機﹕小心衡量利弊﹐冒著看來合理的風險。
3. 非理性投機﹕沒有充足研究形勢就冒險。

謹慎買入大量的股票可以稱為[理性投機]﹔不過如果考慮不周﹐理由欠充份﹐大量買入股票變稱為[非理性投機]。在特殊情況下﹐如果以質量及數量上都吸引的條件買入股票﹐將本身的風險減至最低﹐也看歸類為[分析員投資]。

沒有永久的投資 (buy & hold)

在‘證券分析’第21章<監管所持證券的投資>﹐提到‘永久投資’的概念。

原來﹐在1920至1922年經濟不景氣中﹐‘永久投資’的概念開始受到人們的質疑。過往認為是完美的投資﹐所遭受的損失卻與日俱增。

Mr.Graham 強調﹕

1. 定期檢查所持證券雖然麻煩﹐但有此需要。
2. 轉換﹕如果不能確定證券是否依然穩健﹐他應將之轉換為更好的證券﹐必需接受出售所持證券後帶來損失。
3. 對證券價格更加敏感﹕當證券真實的減值顯示出來前﹐證券價格可能已跌至投機的水平﹐甚至與盈利跌幅不相稱的更低水平。證券持有人相信當前賣出價過低﹐而且發現自己正以投機的方式持有該證券。

解決永久的投資的困難﹐唯一有效方法是﹕提高安全邊際以防不測。
如果在投資之前已力求盡善盡美﹐證券的安全度超高﹐即使證券大大萎縮﹐其地位成疑﹐也能保障安全。此外﹐在所持證券開始變壞了﹐投資者還能夠在有利的情況下轉換其他證券。

所以buy & hold 是投資的過程﹐價值是我們的開始和結束。

安全邊際的概念

慚愧極了﹗
我所知有限﹐因為我現在還是在學習中。


聰明的投資者(The-Intelligent-Investor) 說﹕
1) 投資債券或優先股的安全邊際﹐在于﹕在幾年時間﹐公司的固定收入(稅前)5倍高于債券利息或優先股息。這個5倍超出利率條件的過剩能力構成了安全邊際。如果邊際較大﹐使得投資者充份感覺到對時間變遷的防備﹐保證收益的減少不會立刻影響債券利息或優先股息的派發。

我的看法﹕就好像公司的EBIT﹐如果只是高于finance cost一丁點而已﹐這家公司恐怕隨時會被告而破產。

2) 在一個10年的周期中﹐這個長期數據足以提供一個非常實際的安全邊際﹐在合適的條件下將會避免損失或使損失達到最小。投資于‘代表性’普通股。如果以幾年中市場的平均價購買﹐那麼所支付的價格應當有一個適當的安全邊際來保證。

3) 投資者的風險在于高出市場水平集中購買﹐或購買‘非代表性’的普通股﹐它一般會帶來使收益率下降的風險。

4) 投資者主要的損失來自在有利的商業條件下購買劣質股。往往將現在的好收益等同于收益能力﹐並且假設繁榮和安全性一致的﹔稍高收入卻靠不住﹔兩三年非正常高利潤﹐不知名卻價格遠高于有形資產。

5) 利息費用和股利的範圍必需通過幾年來檢驗﹐包括低于正常商業的週期。

6) 安全邊際和多樣化有緊密的關係。

N)。。。。。。。。慚愧﹗還在學習中。


慚愧﹗我無法舉例說明。